Michigan Journal of International Law
Volume 43

Issue 1

2022

The African Continental Free Trade Area: Local Content
Requirements as a Means to Addressing Africa's Productive
Capacity Constraints
Nchimunya D. Ndulo
Millennium Challenge Corporation

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil
Part of the International Law Commons, International Trade Law Commons, and the Law and
Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Nchimunya D. Ndulo, The African Continental Free Trade Area: Local Content Requirements as a Means to
Addressing Africa's Productive Capacity Constraints, 43 MICH. J. INT'L L. 61 (2022).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol43/iss1/3

https://doi.org/10.36642/mjil.43.1.african
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Journal of International Law at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of
International Law by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

THE AFRICAN CONTINENTAL FREE TRADE
AREA: LOCAL CONTENT REQUIREMENTS AS
A MEANS TO ADDRESSING AFRICA’S
PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS
Nchimunya D. Ndulo*

I. Introduction
The Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area
(“AfCFTA”) creates a single market for goods and services in Africa, the
largest of its kind in terms of geography and population coverage since the
1
creation of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) in January 1995. It is
2
expected to spur significant economic growth and change. By 2030, with
the participation of all African countries, the AfCFTA is projected to create
a market size of “1.7 billion people with over [$]6.7 trillion [USD] of
3
cumulative consumer and business spending.” More conservative estimates
state that it is expected to create a market of approximately 1.2 billion
people covering over $4 trillion US Dollars in combined consumer and
4
business spending and encompass a combined economic output of $2.5
5
trillion USD as of 2018. The World Bank estimates that the AfCFTA has
6
the potential to lift thirty million Africans out of extreme poverty.

*
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of law and international development. She currently serves as a Senior International Attorney
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African Development Bank’s African Legal Support Facility. The author would like to thank
her family and friends that provided valuable feedback and support throughout the preparation
of this article. The author wrote this article in her personal capacity. The opinions and views
expressed in this article are the author’s and do not represent the views of the Millennium
Challenge Corporation.
1.
Landry Signé, Africa Has a New Free Trade Area. This is What You Need to
Know, WORLD ECON. F. (Apr. 3 2018) [hereinafter Signe, Africa Has a New Free Trade
Area]; see also Landry Signé, Africa’s Big New Free Trade Agreement, Explained, WASH.
POST (Mar. 29, 2018) [hereinafter Signé, Africa’s Big New Free Trade Agreement].
2.
See id.
3.
Signé, Africa Has a New Free Trade Area, supra note 1.
4.
Signé, Africa’s Big New Free Trade Agreement, supra note 1.
5.
BROCK R. WILLIAMS & NICOLAS COOK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF11423, AFRICAN
CONTINENTAL FREE TRADE AGREEMENT [“AFCFTA”] 1 (2020).
6.
Franck Kuwonu, Africa’s Free Trade Area Opens for Business, AFR. RENEWAL
(Jan. 7, 2021), https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/january-2021/afcfta-africa-nowopen-business.
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The AfCFTA is rooted in the Abuja Treaty of 1991, in which Member
States of the former Organisation of African Unity, the predecessor of the
African Union (“AU”), “agreed on a roadmap for the creation of a common
7
African market.” In January 2012, during the 18th Ordinary Session of the
Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union, AU
8
Member States adopted a decision to establish a Continental Free Trade
9
Area. In June 2015, AU Member States launched negotiations for the
10
establishment of the AfCFTA. On March 21, 2018, “44 African heads of
state and government officials met in Kigali, Rwanda, to sign the
11
framework [agreement],” thereby setting the stage for the AfCFTA. Under
article 23 of the AfCFTA, the agreement would enter into force thirty days
12
after its ratification by at least twenty-two countries. On May 30, 2019, the
AfCFTA entered into force, thirty days after the twenty-second instrument
13
of ratification was deposited with the AU Commission. On July 7, 2019,
the operational phase of the AfCFTA was launched in Niamey, Niger at the
Twelfth Extra-Ordinary AU Summit, at which point twenty-seven Member
14
States had already ratified the agreement. This marked a diplomatic and
political success in light of the short timeframe since the trade negotiations
began in 2015, the ambitious liberalization goals, “and the heterogeneity
15
and large number” of Member States. As of October 4, 2021, thirty-eight
16
countries had ratified the AfCFTA.
The agreement is being negotiated in three phases, with Phase 1
covering “trade in goods and trade services disciplines, as well as dispute
7.
African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), DEUTSCHE GESELLSCHAFT FÜR
INTERNATIONALE ZUSAMMENARBEIT (GIZ) GMBH, https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide
/59611.html (last visited March 9, 2021).
8.
Member States refers to the states that are party to the African Union (“AU”). See
Constitutive Act of the African Union art. 1, July 11, 2000, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/23.15
(2001).
9.
CFTA - Continental Free Trade Area, AFR. UNION, https://au.int/en/ti/cfta/about
(last visited Mar. 9, 2021); African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Legal Texts and
Policy Documents, TRADE L. CTR. FOR S. AFR. [“TRALAC”], https://www.tralac.org
/resources/our-resources/6730-continental-free-trade-area-cfta.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2021).
10.
LANDRY SIGNÉ & COLETTE VAN DER VEN, KEYS TO SUCCESS FOR THE AFCFTA
NEGOTIATIONS 2 (Afr. Growth Initiative, Brookings Inst., 2019).
11.
Signé, Africa’s Big New Free Trade Agreement, supra note 1.
12.
Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area art. 23, Mar. 21,
2018, 58 I.L.M. 1028 [hereinafter AfCFTA].
13.
Id. arts. 23(1), 24; Kuwonu, supra note 6; AFCFTA Ratification Barometer,
TRALAC (Oct. 4 2021), https://www.tralac.org/documents/resources/infographics/2605status-of-afcfta-ratification/file.html.
14.
Trudi Hartzenberg, The African Continental Free Trade Area Agreement – What is
Expected of LDCs in Terms of Trade Liberalisation?, U.N. LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
PORTAL, (Aug. 2019).
15.
DEUTSCHE GESELLSCHAFT FÜR INTERNATIONALE ZUSAMMENARBEIT (GIZ)
GMBH, supra note 7.
16.
TRALAC, supra note 13
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settlement.” With respect to services, State Parties have “agreed to
propose liberalization through a request-and-offer approach, based on seven
identified priority sectors: logistics and transport, financial services,
tourism, professional services, energy services, construction, and
19
communications.” Tariff concessions are yet to be fully negotiated among
the State Parties. As of November 2021, State Parties were in a position to
start trading on preferential terms for over eighty-eight percent of products,
20
while negotiations on the remaining twelve percent are ongoing. This
follows the agreement on the Rules of Origin for eighty-eight percent of
21
tariff lines. Phase 2 will address cooperation on investment, competition,
22
and intellectual property rights. In February 2020, the AU approved a third
23
phase of negotiations which will develop a Protocol on E-Commerce.
24
Trading under the AfCFTA was expected to begin on July 1, 2020, but in
light of disruptions and delays brought on by the COVID-19 pandemic,
25
trading began on January 1, 2021.
All State Parties are expected to reach the same level of trade
liberalization, although a distinction is made between least developed
countries (“LDCs”) and non-LDCs in terms of the timeline afforded to
26
achieve the process. While all State Parties have agreed to liberalize ninety
percent of tariff lines, LDCs have ten years to achieve ninety percent
27
liberalization, whereas non-LDCs have five years. Further distinctions are
made between sensitive and non-sensitive products concerning the
17.
Hartzenberg, supra note 14.
18.
State Parties are AU Member States that have ratified or acceded to the Agreement
Establishing the AfCFTA and “for which the Agreement is in force.” AfCFTA, supra note 12,
art. 1(v).
19.
LISANDRO ABREGO, MARIO DE ZAMARÓCZY, TUNC GURSOY, SALIFOU ISSOUFOU,
GARTH P. NICHOLLS, HECTOR PEREZ-SAIZ & JOSE-NICOLAS ROSAS, THE AFRICAN
CONTINENTAL FREE TRADE AREA: POTENTIAL ECONOMIC IMPACT AND CHALLENGES 17
(2020).
20.
Phillip Xolisa, AfCFTA: Africa Inches Closer to Target Goal on Rules of Origin,
AFR. REP. (Nov. 17, 2021) https://www.theafricareport.com/147382/afcfta-africa-inchescloser-to-target-goal-on-rules-of-origin/.
21.
Id. Some sources suggest that the rules of origin for more than eighty-six percent
of tariff lines have been agreed to. DDG Ellard Stresses WTO’s commitment to support
AfCFTA Implementation, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION [“WTO”], https://www.wto.org
/english/news_e/news21_e/ddgae_25nov21_e.htm (last visited Dec. 15, 2021).
22.
AfCFTA, supra note 12, art. 7.
23.
Decision on the African Continental Free Trade Area of the Thirty Third Session
of the African Union Assembly, Doc. Assembly/AU/4 (XXXIII), ¶23 (Feb. 9–10, 2020).
24.
Kuwonu, supra note 6.
25.
Id.; TRALAC, supra note 13.
26.
See Hartzenberg, supra note 14. Least developed countries, LDCs, refer to
countries designated as such by the United Nations. List of Least Developed Countries,
UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp-content/uploads/sites/45
/publication/ldc_list.pdf (last visited Dec. 22, 2021).
27.
See Hartzenberg, supra note 14.
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liberalization of tariff lines. According to the Schedules of Tariff
28
Concessions,
[t]he remaining 10% of tariff lines [are] divided into two
categories. 7% can be designated sensitive products and 3% of
tariff lines can be excluded from liberalisation entirely. LDCs have
13 years to eliminate tariffs on sensitive products and may maintain
their current tariffs for the first 5 years, backloading liberalisation
during the remaining 8 years. Non-LDCs have 10 years to eliminate
tariffs on sensitive products and may also retain the status quo,
starting liberalisation in year 6. Both LDCs and non-LDCs may
exclude 3% of tariff lines, but the excluded products may not
29
account for more than 10% of their total trade.
The list of excluded products is subject to negotiation and review every
30
five years. A special carve-out has been made for what are referred to as
“G-6 countries,” which argue that they face specific development
31
challenges. These countries include Ethiopia, Madagascar, Malawi, Sudan,
Zambia, and Zimbabwe, which have secured a fifteen-year “phase-down”
32
period to liberalize ninety percent of tariff lines. How these countries will
divide the remaining ten percent of tariff lines between sensitive and
33
excluded products is yet to be determined. Applying a Special and
Differential Treatment approach to timelines for tariff reductions, the
AfCFTA uses a progressive and incremental approach to introducing
timelines that are tailored to the priorities and capabilities of participating
34
countries.
The AfCFTA is expected to “transform Africa from a fractured,
commodity-dependent group of economies into a vibrant, integrated market
35
of over 1.2 billion people.” It is projected to offer substantial opportunities
for industrialization and diversification, as well as employment across

28.
Schedules of Tariff Concessions, Schedules of Specific Commitments, or
Schedules refer to the commitments countries make under trade agreements with respect to
preferential tariffs or treatment afforded for specified products or sectors. See, e.g., AfCFTA,
supra note 12, art. 8 (Protocol on Trade in Goods), art. 22 (Protocol on Trade in Services).
29.
Hartzenberg, supra note 14; Schedules of Tariff Concessions, AFCFTA
SECRETARIAT, https://afcfta.au.int/en/schedules-tariff-concessions (last visited July 15, 2021).
30.
AFCFTA SECRETARIAT, supra note 29.
31.
Hartzenberg, supra note 14.
32.
Id.
33.
Id.
34.
AfCFTA, supra note 12, art. 6 (Protocol on Trade in Goods), art. 7 (Protocol on
Trade in Services).
35.
Benedict Okey Oramah, Facilitating the Transformational AfCFTA: Tools for
Eliminating Bottlenecks, in BROOKINGS AFRICA GROWTH INITIATIVE: FORESIGHT AFRICA
2021 69, 69 (Aloysius Uche Ordu ed., 2021).
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Africa as better market access produces economies of scale. However, the
onset of the AfCFTA’s implementation brings to the forefront some
bottlenecks that governments and the private sector, in collaboration, need
to address in order to ensure that the AfCFTA achieves its full potential.
These bottlenecks include non-tariff barriers such as infrastructure deficits
and poor logistics performance, and most importantly, the need to increase
productive capacity and produce more tradable goods.
This article argues that the use of local content requirements presents an
avenue for countries to develop local products and services, which in turn
could help diversify economies, develop local industries, and contribute to
the growth in productive capacity. In arriving at this conclusion, this article
assesses the potential impact of the AfCFTA by discussing the potential
disparate and fiscal impacts of the implementation of the AfCFTA on the
range of economies of the State Parties, the limitations non-tariff barriers
impose on the AfCFTA’s successful implementation, the extent of the
AfCFTA’s impact as it relates to the informal sector, and the current status
of trade in Africa. Following an assessment of the current status of trade in
the region, this article argues that an inhibiting factor to increased regional
trade is limited productive capacity among many African countries. This
article then demonstrates how the use of local content requirements, in the
context of foreign direct investment (“FDI”), can facilitate the development
of local skills and product inputs, create local content linkages, and act as a
means to developing productive capacity. In doing so, this article analyzes
37
the available policy space for the use of local content requirements in the
context of international trade agreements. In conclusion, this article argues
that by increasing their productive capacity, State Parties will be able to
participate more fruitfully and actively in intraregional trade under the
AfCFTA.

II. The AfCFTA’s Potential Impact
While the AfCFTA has the potential to create the largest trading block
and significant economic activity across the African continent, its
implementation also highlights some of the hindrances to its potential
impact. Under ideal conditions, “[t]rade integration allows countries to
specialize in the production of goods and services for which they have [a]
comparative advantage and to exploit economies of scale, thereby

36.
See Signé, Africa Has a New Free Trade Area, supra note 1; see Signé, Africa’s
Big New Free Trade Agreement, supra note 1.
37.
The term “policy space” refers to the ‘“scope for domestic policies, especially in
areas of trade, investment and industrial development’ which might be ‘framed by
international disciplines, commitments and global market considerations.’” Isabelle Ramdoo,
Local Content, Trade and Investment: Is there Policy Space for Linkages Development in
Resource-rich Countries 1 (Eur. Ctr. for Dev. Pol’y, Discussion Paper No. 250, 2016).
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improving productivity and growth.” However, many bottlenecks still
remain to be resolved before this can be achieved in the context of the
AfCFTA. This section aims to discuss the potential impact of the AfCFTA
more broadly and the bottlenecks that may inhibit its projected impact. In
doing so, this section begins with assessing the potential fiscal impact of the
AfCFTA by looking at how the size of a state’s economy may influence its
potential gains from the AfCFTA. This section focuses on analyzing the
limitations imposed by non-tariff barriers, such as poor infrastructure and
logistics, on the successful implementation of the AfCFTA and concludes
that removing non-tariff bottlenecks would augment the effect of tariff
reductions on increased trade. This section also assesses the current state of
intraregional trade and its key hindrances. It highlights poor integration with
respect to regional value-chains, a by-product of limited productive
capacity, as a main constraint to increasing intraregional trade. This section
concludes with an analysis of how far-reaching the projected benefits from
the implementation of the AfCFTA could be in relation to Africa’s
predominant informal sector and demonstrates that skills development is a
determining factor in allowing the informal sector to meet the demands of
local and regional markets.

A. Disparate and Fiscal Impacts
The implementation of the AfCFTA raises the concern that it may stifle
smaller economies, in terms of market competition between larger and
smaller economies and losses in fiscal revenues due to tariff removals. In
terms of market competition, the concern is that smaller economies would
not be able to compete with larger economies in the production of certain
goods, be it through the quality or pricing of goods. Currently, a small
number of large economies dominate intra-African trade and the same
39
economies account for nearly all value-added activity. South Africa, for
example, accounted for twenty-five percent of total intra-African trade in
40
2017. Some argue that it is the larger African economies, such as Egypt,
Kenya, and South Africa, that are likely to benefit the most from the
41
AfCFTA due to their more developed industrial landscapes. These
industrial landscapes position larger African economies to develop
innovative products and produce goods in quantities that allow them to
42
respond to market demand. Furthermore, with a relatively strong
38.
Geremia Palomba, Russell Green, Salifou Issoufou, Thomas McGregor, Adrian
Peralta-Alva, Amadou Sy, Bruno Versailles, & Jason Weiss, Is the African Continental Free
Trade Area a Game Changer for the Continent?, in SUB-SAHARAN AFR. REG’L ECON.
OUTLOOK: RECOVERY AMID ELEVATED UNCERTAINTY 39, 39 (2019).
39.
See WILLIAMS & COOK, supra note 5, at 2.
40.
Id.
41.
Signé, Africa Has a New Free Trade Area, supra note 1; Signé, Africa’s Big New
Free Trade Agreement, supra note 1.
42.
Signé, Africa Has a New Free Trade Area, supra note 1.
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manufacturing base already in existence, their manufactured products would
43
gain access to a large continental market.
Differences in fiscal impact, due to tariff removals, are also expected
between smaller and larger economies, thereby possibly further stifling
smaller economies. Across Africa as a whole, in a scenario where all tariffs
are fully eliminated, it is estimated that the fiscal losses associated with the
removal of trade tariffs will amount to over $4.1 billion USD in the short
44
term, the equivalent of 9.1 percent of revenues as of 2019. In a scenario
where exemptions are given to certain sensitive products (“[a]ssuming that
the sector with the highest current tariff revenue . . . would be exempted”),
tariff revenue losses are estimated to amount to $3.2 billion USD, or 7.2
45
percent of revenues across Africa as of 2019. For the most part, the fiscal
revenue losses are likely to be limited as tariffs comprise a low percentage
of fiscal revenue on average; a low percentage of this revenue resulting
46
from intraregional trade. Furthermore, “revenue-to-GDP” ratios remain
47
very low. In Africa, from 2010 to 2015, “customs revenue averaged about
2.5 percent of GDP (16 percent of total tax revenue), and overall regional
imports, including zero-rated imports within [Regional Economic
48
Communities (“RECs”)], averaged about 17 percent of total imports.”
Amongst countries with smaller and less developed economies, the
effects of the removal of tariffs present a greater concern, as tariff revenues
remain an important source of government revenue and are “an important
49
measure to reduce import competition and [to] protect domestic industry.”
In particular, the effects of losses in fiscal revenue due to tariff reductions
may be felt to a greater extent amongst countries with growing debt
sustainability concerns and experiencing widening deficits. As a result,
some countries may need to adopt policies that will generate domestic
revenue as they seek to mitigate the effects of revenue losses from tariff
reductions. However, tariff losses may be offset in the long run by “higher
tax revenue from increased consumption and income, as a result of reduced

43.
Id.
44.
Mesut Saygili, Ralf Peters & Christian Knebel, African Continental Free Trade
Area: Challenges and Opportunities of Tariff Reductions 3 (U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev.
[“UNCTAD”], Rsch. Paper No. 15, 2018).
45.
Id.
46.
Palomba et al., supra note 38, at 51; see ABREGO ET AL., supra note 19, at 8
(discussing how the expectation of limited fiscal losses arising from tariff eliminations under
the AfCFTA is a result of a “low level of effectively applied intraregional import tariffs, the
rather modest level of intraregional trade, and a small reduction in imports from the rest of the
world.”).
47.
Hippolyte Fofack, Mitigating Short-term Adjustment Costs: Preparing for the
AfCFTA, BROOKINGS (Dec. 29, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020
/12/29/mitigating-short-term-adjustment-costs-preparing-for-the-afcfta/.
48.
Palomba et al., supra note 38, at 51.
49.
Hartzenberg, supra note 14.
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50

trade barriers . . .” Also worth considering is the fact that, for some
countries, the ability to substitute goods from high-tariff countries with
goods from low-tariff countries as a result of the AfCFTA may have a
positive fiscal effect. Therefore, the lower cost of goods may compensate, at
least in part, for the loss in tariff revenue. Ultimately, the long-term solution
is for a country to diversify its economy’s sources of growth—including
51
productivity and revenue—in order to reduce its economic volatility.
Regional development finance institutions are also seeking to play a
role in ameliorating these effects. Through these institutions, initiatives have
been put in place to alleviate the effects of reductions in tariff revenues that
are felt by some countries as a result of the AfCFTA. One such initiative is
the $5 billion USD AfCFTA Adjustment Facility launched by the Africa
52
Export-Import Bank (“Afrexim”), Africa’s largest trade financing bank.
This initiative pledged to support countries having to adjust to sudden tariff
53
revenue losses resulting from the implementation of the AfCFTA. The
Facility “will cover the short-term fiscal losses and support medium-to-long
term adjustments of production activities in African countries to enable
54
them to take advantage of the opportunities arising from the AfCFTA.”
Overall, the fiscal impact due to tariff removals may not be as significant
and as widely spread across Africa; however, countries with smaller and
less developed economies may be disproportionately affected by such fiscal
changes. Some of the benefits arising from intraregional trade under the
AfCFTA, as well as Afrexim’s AfCFTA Adjustment Facility’s instruments,
may help mitigate some of the losses a country may experience.

B. The Impact of Non-Tariff Barriers on the Successful Implementation
of the AfCFTA
The impact of non-tariff barriers on the effectiveness of the AfCTA is a
key concern surrounding its implementation. Such non-tariff barriers
include logistics performance and deficits, infrastructure deficits, access to
55
credit, border processes, and customs practices. Other non-tariff barriers

50.
ABREGO ET AL., supra note 19, at 8, 24 (discussing the four channels through
which the reduction in trade barriers stemming from the AfCFTA would affect tax revenues:
“First, a direct reduction in tax revenue is to be expected from the removal of tariffs on intracontinental imports. Second, trade diversion owing to lower tariffs would also reduce
revenues. Third, higher GDP, owing to increased efficiency, would lead to more revenue.
Fourth, higher consumption, because of increased imports and income, would also raise
revenue. Importantly, the last three channels would reflect the impact not only of tariff
removal but also of NTB [non-tariff barriers] removal. In sum, the net impact of the AfCFTA
on tax revenues would depend on the combined effect of the four channels.”).
51.
See Fofack, supra note 47.
52.
See Oramah, supra note 35, at 69.
53.
Id.
54.
Id.
55.
Palomba et al., supra note 38, at 46.
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include restrictive regulations and procedures concerning “quotas, licenses,
and complex or dissimilar rules of origin—as well as sanitary,
56
phytosanitary, and technical barriers . . .” Statistics show that African
countries experience some of the highest non-tariff trade costs in the
57
world. Non-tariff barriers can hinder trade and offset expected gains from
tariff reductions. Research demonstrates that “while the average applied rate
of tariff protection in Africa is 8.7 [percent], other obstacles have been
58
found to increase the cost of African trade by an estimated 283 [percent].”
A study conducted by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
(“UNECA”) indicates that under the AfCFTA, “intra-African trade could
increase from 10.2 [percent] in 2010 to 15.5 [percent] in 2022,” and that
addressing non-tariff barriers could more than double the AfCFTA’s
59
expected impact on trade in the same time period to 21.9 percent.
Studies show that in Africa, trade logistics remain “the most significant
direct impediment to intraregional trade” and the development of regional
60
value chains. An International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) report states that
“[i]mproving customs services, including clearance procedures and to some
extent the quality of operating and brokerage services, is particularly
61
important for []intraregional trade flows in Africa.” Studies project that if
logistics in Africa were brought to the level of the global average in terms of
62
quality, “an improvement of about 19 percent[,]” the cost of the crossborder movement of goods would lower and intraregional trade would
63
increase by over twelve percent.
In terms of infrastructure, African manufacturers remain constrained by
64
unreliable and expensive power networks. They are also hindered by poor
transport systems that are comprised of inadequate ports, rail, and road
65
networks, many of which are remnants of colonial transport routes not
56.
Id.
57.
Id.
58.
UNCTAD, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA REPORT 2019: MADE IN AFRICA
– RULES OF ORIGIN FOR ENHANCED INTRA-AFRICAN TRADE 31 (2019) [hereinafter
UNCTAD].
59.
Id. at 32.
60.
Palomba et al., supra note 38, at 46.
61.
Id. at 47.
62.
Id. at 46.
63.
Id. at 46–47; ABREGO ET AL., supra note 19, at 14. The AfCFTA Secretariat, in
collaboration with UNCTAD, has developed an online tool to report, monitor, and address
restrictive regulatory and procedural non-tariff barriers. AfCFTA Support Programme to
Eliminate Non-Tariff Barriers, Increase Regulatory Transparency and Promote Industrial
Diversification, UNCTAD, https://unctad.org/project/afcfta-support-programme-eliminatenon-tariff-barriers-increase-regulatory-transparency-and (last visited Dec. 15, 2021).
64.
AFR. DEV. BANK GRP., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., U.N. DEV.
PROGRAMME & U.N. ECONOMIC COMM’N FOR AFR., AFRICAN ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 2012:
PROMOTING YOUTH EMPLOYMENT 65 (2012) [hereinafter Afr. Econ. Outlook].
65.
See id. at 65.
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structured for intraregional trade but rather for the purposes of moving raw
66
materials from mining towns to ports for export. An IMF study has shown
that bringing the quality of infrastructure in Africa to that of the global
average would require “(an improvement in infrastructure quality of about
40 percent) and would spur a 7 percent increase in intraregional trade
67
68
flows” by lowering the cost of the movement of goods across borders.
Amongst countries with poor infrastructure, the expected returns on
increases in trade flow, if infrastructure is improved, is estimated to be even
higher, with some studies suggesting that improved infrastructure could
69
potentially double the effect of tariff reductions. Many of the concerns
resulting from poor infrastructure and logistics are heightened in
approximately a third of Africa’s countries, where geography poses further
70
limitations due to their landlocked nature. According to the African
Development Bank’s 2019 African Economic Outlook, “[l]andlocked
countries in Africa, many of them low income, tend to engage more in intraAfrica trade than coastal or middle-income countries” due to their
71
geographic constraints. However, “an estimated 77 percent of their export
72
value consists of transport costs . . .” In other African countries, the share
of export value attributed to transport costs ranges between thirty percent
73
and fifty percent. In contrast, the average for transportation costs in
74
developing countries in other regions is estimated at seventeen percent.
These costs are often inflated by burdensome customs procedures,
inadequate operational coordination, and weak harmonization of regulations
75
on transit carriers. Poor infrastructure hampers economic activity. As a
result, raw materials are unable to get to factories, production cannot
76
happen, and goods do not reach consumers. Therefore, “trade and financial
77
activities cannot flourish within or across borders.” Plainly stated,

66.
See Rémi Jedwab, Edward Kerby & Alexander Moradi, How Colonial Railroads
Defined Africa’s Economic Geography, VOX EUR. UNION (March 2, 2017), https://voxeu.org
/article/how-colonial-railroads-defined-africa-s-economic-geography.
67.
Palomba et al., supra note 38, at 47.
68.
See id. at 47–48.
69.
Id.
70.
Id.
71.
AFR. DEV. BANK GRP., AFR. ECON. OUTLOOK 122 (2019).
72.
Id.
73.
AFR. DEV. BANK GRP., supra note 64, at 65.
74.
Id.
75.
Id.
76.
AFR. UNION COMM’N, AFR. DEV. BANK GRP. & U.N. ECON. COMM’N FOR AFR.,
AFRICA REGIONAL INTEGRATION INDEX REPORT 2019 13 (2019) [hereinafter Integration
Index Report].
77.
Id.
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production moving beyond national borders, including under the AfCFTA,
78
is dependent on functioning logistics and transportation infrastructure.
In an illustrative study, the United Nations Conference for Trade and
Development (“UNCTAD”) noted the “additional costs that poor transport
and transit facilitation impose on the competitiveness of exports from
79
Ethiopia.” The study showed that the costs of labor for “making a T-shirt
in Ethiopia are one third of the costs in China, yet the logistics expenses of
exporting the shirt mean that, in international markets, a shirt made in
80
Ethiopia sells for the same price as a shirt made in China.” High logistics
81
costs negatively impact trade. A cyclical relationship exists between
investing in infrastructure and logistics and increased trade; on the one
hand, investment in infrastructure and logistics can lead to increased trade,
82
which in turn makes further investments more profitable. On the other
hand, “poorly functioning [infrastructure and] logistics markets lead to a
83
vicious circle of low trade volume and high trade costs.”
It is important for states to develop infrastructure that stimulates
economic activity by not only facilitating trade but also by generating
84
employment and bolstering supply chains. It is also important for states to
develop multipurpose infrastructure that can benefit multiple sectors and
85
that could lead to the development of infrastructure-led linkages, which
result when infrastructure developed for a specific sector benefits other
86
productive sectors. Improved infrastructure and logistics would reduce the
cost of doing business. Infrastructure and logistics bottlenecks currently
undermine the potential of trade policies to promote trade and therefore
threaten to reduce the potential impact of the AfCFTA.
Increased access to credit for the private sector would also play a
87
pivotal role in enhancing intraregional trade. The IMF’s 2015 Regional
Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa report states that “[f]urther
78.
Id.
79.
UNCTAD, supra note 58, at 32.
80.
Id.
81.
Palomba et al., supra note 38, at 46.
82.
AFR. DEV. BANK GRP., supra note 71, at 101.
83.
Id.
84.
Alain Ebobissé, Improving Infrastructure in Africa: Creating Long-Term
Resilience Through Investment, in BROOKINGS AFRICA GROWTH INITIATIVE: FORESIGHT
AFRICA 2021, at 71, 71 (Aloysius Uche Ordu ed., 2021).
85.
See AARON COSBEY & ISABELLE RAMDOO, INTERGOVERNMENTAL FORUM GUIDANCE
FOR GOVERNMENTS: LOCAL CONTENT POLICIES, at ix (2018), https://www.iisd.org/system/files
/publications/igf-guidance-for-governments-local-content.pdf [hereinafter IGF]; see also Duncan
Miriri, African Union to Set up Infrastructure Fund for the Continent, REUTERS (Feb. 19, 2021)
(discussing the need for regional infrastructure for the AfCFTA to succeed and the AU establishing
an infrastructure fund to address the infrastructure gaps needed for development and the success of
the AfCFTA).
86.
COSBEY et al., supra note 85, at ix.
87.
Palomba et al., supra note 38, at 47.
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financial deepening to the level observed elsewhere in the world would
88
support an expansion of trade by as much as 29 percent.” Developing
human capital, banking networks, and financial services, as well as
harmonizing regional payments systems, creating a multicurrency clearing
center to reduce the costs of trading in different currencies, and addressing
concerns of currency convertibility would also expect to have significant
89
effects on increasing intraregional trade. An Africa-wide digital payment
system has been developed by Afrexim, in collaboration with the AU, in
90
anticipation of the implementation of the AfCFTA. Afrexim’s Pan-African
91
Payment and Settlement System is expected to be a platform that will
domesticate intraregional payments (allowing for payments in local
92
currencies), which could save the continent “more than $5 billion [USD]
93
in payment transaction costs per annum.” Access to credit plays a key role
in allowing industries to develop and is a prerequisite for businesses to scale
the production of tradable goods. This prerequisite, coupled with the ability
to domesticate intraregional payments through regional payment systems
and to facilitate currency convertibility, will play a significant role in easing
the flow of trade within the region and will allow entities trading under the
AfCFTA to maximize the value earned from intraregional trade.

C. The Current State of Intraregional Trade in Africa
A major concern raised in the context of the AfCFTA’s impact is the
question: What will Africa trade? Essentially, will the productive capacity
of State Parties allow them to actively trade under the AfCFTA? In
discussing this issue, it is important to assess the current state of
intraregional trade, specifically, the level of productivity and diversification.
Weak productive capacities and limited economic diversification may
constrict the range of intermediate and final goods that can be traded by and
94
between countries, all of which affect the development of regional value
95
chains. Furthermore, studies show a strong correlation between the
96
availability of complex production capabilities and economic growth. It is
essential that governments create enabling conditions to ensure that
88.
Céline Allard, Jorge Iván Canales Kriljenko, Wenjie Chen, Jesus Gonzalez-Garcia,
Emmanouil Kitsios & Juan Treviño, Global Value Chains: Where Are You? The Missing Link
in Sub-Saharan Africa’s Trade Integration, in REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, SUBSAHARAN AFRICA: NAVIGATING HEADWINDS 47, 55 (Int’l Monetary Fund [“IMF”], 2015)
[hereinafter IMF].
89.
Palomba et al., supra note 38, at 47.
90.
Oramah, supra note 35, at 69; Hartzenberg, supra note 14.
91.
Id.
92.
Oramah, supra note 35, at 69.
93.
Hartzenberg, supra note 14.
94.
See UNCTAD, supra note 58, at 29.
95.
Id.
96.
See id. at 24.
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productivity rises to internationally competitive standards. Their goal must
97
be to diversify the range and sophistication of production and services.
The importance of diversification is evident in that “[c]ountries that have
more diversified exports [also] tend to have higher shares of intra-African
98
exports than countries that have less diversified exports,” as diversification
99
creates more possibilities for intraregional trade. In 2018, it was estimated
that sixteen percent of Africa’s total exports were intraregional,
considerably lower when compared with intraregional trade in most global
regions including North America (thirty percent), Asia (sixty percent), and
100
Europe (sixty-nine percent). It is important to note that these figures do
not capture informal cross-border trade, which constitutes a large percentage
101
of trade within Africa. However, there has been a demonstrated increase
in intraregional trade across Africa from seven percent to sixteen percent
102
from 1990 to 2018, respectively. This has been attributed to “an increase
in commodity exports, stronger macroeconomic conditions and institutions,
103
and the establishment of regional economic arrangements [RECs].” This
intraregional trade occurred primarily within RECs, seventy-five percent of
104
which occurred in five of the eight RECs in 2017, with the Southern
African Development Community alone “accounting for half of such trade
105
flows.”
Despite RECs across Africa spurring a large expansion of intraregional
trade, their performance in comparison to RECs of other regions has been
lagging. This is attributed, in part, to “a lack of complementary domestic
reforms to improve domestic supply responses and a low level of
implementation of the arrangements, owing partly to the absence of strong
106
institutional frameworks supporting them.” The different trade rules
applied in the different RECs, as well as the terms of bilateral agreements,
97.
See id. at 23-24; see Fofack, supra note 47.
98.
UNCTAD, supra note 58, at 23.
99.
Id. at. 23, 29, 45 (“The wider the range of intermediate goods to be sourced from
within Africa, the wider the possibilities for more firms in Africa to participate as suppliers
and for countries in Africa to engage in manufacturing, technological upgrading and economic
and export diversification.” Id.).
100.
WILLIAMS & COOK, supra note 5, at 1–2; see also UNCTAD, supra note 58, at 19–20 (stating that “Intra-African exports were 16.6 per cent of total exports in 2017, compared
with 68.1 [percent] in Europe, 59.4 [percent] in Asia, 55.0 [percent] in America and 7.0
[percent] in Oceania. Intra-African trade . . . hovered at around 15.2 [percent] in the period
2015-2017, while comparative figures for America, Asia, Europe and Oceania were,
respectively, 47.4, 61.1, 67.1 and 7.2 [percent].”).
101.
See infra pp. 74–75.
102.
WILLIAMS & COOK, supra note 5, at 1–2. More conservative estimates suggest
growth from five percent to twelve percent from 1990 to 2017. Palomba, supra note 38, at 41.
103.
ABREGO ET AL., supra note 19, at 10.
104.
WILLIAMS & COOK, supra note 5, at 2; Palomba et al., supra note 38, at 43.
105.
Palomba et al., supra note 38, at 43.
106.
ABREGO ET AL., supra note 19, at 9.
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have also contributed to the rise in the cost of trading within the continent.
Multiple and overlapping memberships in RECs have “led to complexity,
108
lax enforcement, and uncertainty.” Infrastructure bottlenecks and their
109
associated high costs have also hampered the impact of RECs. All of
these factors, coupled with a “lack of complementary reforms to improve
domestic supply responses and upgrade worker skills have hindered [the
110
development of] economies of scale.”
The AfCFTA has attempted to address the concerns arising from the
different trade rules applied by different RECs and the possible
complications resulting from State Parties being members of several RECs.
The AfCFTA provides that “[i]n the event of any conflict and inconsistency
between [the AfCFTA] and any regional agreement, [the AfCFTA] shall
111
prevail to the extent of the specific inconsistency.” It further provides that
State Parties that are members of RECs that have attained higher levels of
regional integration than they will under the AfCFTA, “shall maintain such
112
higher levels among themselves.” In doing so, the AfCFTA attempts to
provide for legal harmonization, to the extent possible, between the rules of
different RECs and the AfCFTA. However, some argue that the AfCFTA’s
113
lack of the traditional unconditional “Most-Favoured-Nation” clause with
respect to trade in goods, which is found in trade agreements such as the
114
WTO’s General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”), but rather
the AfCFTA’s requirement to accord State Parties the “Most-FavouredNation Treatment” on a reciprocal basis, still poses the risk of having a
115
“patchwork” of different rights and obligations amongst State Parties. The
AfCFTA’s approach is aimed at protecting existing RECs and preserving
116
the acquis. However, for the tariff lines not subject to immediate or
complete liberalization, the AfCFTA’s reciprocal requirement could result
107.
Palomba et al., supra note 38, at 44.
108.
ABREGO ET AL., supra note 19, at 11 (discussing how Africa is characterized by a
plethora of trade regimes, regional, bilateral, and other non-regional trade regimes).
109.
Id.
110.
Id.
111.
AfCFTA, supra note 12, art. 19(1).
112.
Id. art. 19(2).
113.
See infra p. 34 (discussing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’s
traditional unconditional “Most-Favoured Nation Treatment” clause).
114.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art 1(I), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
115.
SIGNÉ & VAN DER VEN, supra note 10, at 4–5; see also AfCFTA, supra note 12,
art. 4(1) (Protocol on Trade in Goods), art. 18; cf. GATT, supra note 114, art. I(1) (requiring
Members to accord “immediately and unconditionally” the “Most-Favoured-Nation
Treatment” to like products originating from or destined for Members that are contracting
parties.).
116.
SIGNÉ & VAN DER VEN, supra note 10, at 4. Notably, the AfCFTA applies the
unconditional “Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment” clause with respect to trade in services.
AfCFTA, supra note 12, art. 4(1) (Protocol on Trade in Services).
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in situations where products from non-State Parties “are treated more
favorably than the same products imported from African countries [by]
117
other African countries[,]” pursuant to the application of the GATT.
Africa’s intraregional exports are more diversified, less commoditydependent, and comprised of more technological content than its exports to
the rest of the world. On average, “in 2015-2017, exports of manufactures
accounted for 45 [percent] of intra-African exports, but only 20 [percent] of
118
exports from Africa to the rest of the world.” Between 2014 and 2016,
“[m]ineral products (petroleum, ores, etc.) account[ed] for 33 [percent] of
intra-African exports and constitute[d] 50 [percent] of total exports from
119
Africa to the rest of the world.” For the most part, “[t]rade in Africa
nevertheless remains concentrated in less processed and low-technology
goods than trade in other regions of the world and shows limited signs of
120
value-chain creation.” When compared with intraregional trade in other
parts of the world, intraregional trade in Africa is more focused on minerals
121
and less on manufacturing. However, this form of trade is limiting, as
African countries generally export minerals in their raw form and therefore
do not obtain the additional trade value resulting from their processed
122
form. Some argue that to warrant the development of processes for value
addition and to build the requisite processing capacity, countries would need
to consider whether there is a large enough market for processed raw
123
materials either locally or regionally. While others, citing how the
development of diamond-processing capacities in Botswana has shifted the
patterns of production and intraregional trade, argue that “developing the
capacity to process primary commodities and natural resources could create
a virtuous cycle of inclusive growth and expansion of intra-African
124
trade.” Nevertheless, there remains an international market for raw

117.
SIGNÉ & VAN DER VEN, supra note 10, at 5; see also GATT, supra note 114, art.
1.
118.
UNCTAD, supra note 58, at 23.
119.
Id.
120.
Palomba, et al., supra note 38, at 43.
121.
Id.
122.
See Jeff Geipel & Dan Hetherington, Local Content Policy: What Works, What
Doesn’t Work 15–16 (Oct. 30, 2018) (Bus. Env’t Reform Facility: U.K. Dep’t for Int’l
Dev., Working Paper) [hereinafter DFID], http://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media
/5c7d425aed915d4063af98df/BERF-Zimbabwe-What-Works-in-Local-Content-Policy30Oct18.pdf; see Hippolyte Fofack, Overcoming the Colonial Development Model of
Resource Extraction for Sustainable Development in Africa, BROOKINGS (Jan. 31, 2019),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2019/01/31/overcoming-the-colonialdevelopment-model-of-resource-extraction-for-sustainable-development-in-africa.
123.
See generally DFID, supra note 122, at 15. (explaining how both Sweden and
Australia have the technical ability to process iron ore into steel, but they have chosen not to
as “it does not make economic sense in either case because neither has a natural large market
for steel.”).
124.
Fofack, supra note 122.
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materials to which many African countries contribute. However, a
reliance on trading raw materials makes countries and their economies
126
vulnerable to the volatility of commodity prices.
Africa’s intra-industry trade is lower than that of other regions, which
127
signals less integration amongst regional value chains on the continent. A
recent report produced by the African Development Bank and UNECA
128
confirms that Africa is poorly integrated on the production front. The
report states that “production is not geographically dispersed within the
continent and countries are not reaping the benefits of variations in
129
comparative advantage across countries.” This is in large part due to poor
logistics, the improvement of which is necessary to operationalize regional
130
supply chains. The COVID-19 pandemic’s disruption of global supply
chains has highlighted the need to increase the presence of local and
regional production and regional value chains. This disruption has resulted
in imports being halted and production minimized, and in some instances
ceased for products as critical as food supplies and as integral as materials
131
for large-scale infrastructure projects. The current state of intraregional
trade demonstrates that productive capacity for the production of valueadded goods remains low across Africa, as trade is still very much
dominated by the trade of raw materials, both globally and regionally. This
limited productive capacity will hinder the extent to which State Parties can
132
fully participate in trade under the AfCFTA.

D. Will the Informal Sector Benefit from the AfCFTA’s Increased Trade
Flows?
Another question often raised about the AfCFTA concerns how many
Africans, on average, will benefit from the potential changes often promised
to result from increased trade flows. Many of Africa’s economies are
comprised of a large informal sector, often associated with higher levels of
133
inequality and lower-skilled labor, and accounting for approximately
125.
See Afr. Econ. Outlook, supra note 64, at 27, 10.
126.
See Fofack, supra note 122; see IGF, supra note 85, at vi; id. at 10.
127.
Palomba et al., supra note 38, at 43.
128.
Integration Index Report, supra note 76, at 10.
129.
Id. at 29.
130.
Id.
131.
See Astrid R.N Haas & Victoria Delbridge, Africa: Restrictions in Trade to
Contain Covid-19 Have Been Devastating for Africa’s Urban Poor, THE CONVERSATION
(Oct. 26, 2020) (discussing how as a result of disruptions in trade routes due to the impact of
the COVID-19 pandemic, sub-Saharan African growth is expected to contract by 3.2 percent);
see COVID-19 OPERATIONAL DISRUPTIONS IN INFRASTRUCTURE, WORLD BANK GRP. (Sept.
25, 2020), https://ppi.worldbank.org/content/dam/PPI/documents/Operational-disruptionsdue-to-COVID—September—.pdf.
132.
This conclusion is based on the author’s analysis and professional experience.
133.
Palomba et al., supra note 38, at 50–51.
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134

eighty-five percent of economic activity in the region. The informal sector
is also dominated by women and youth, resulting in further social
135
inequalities, with women accounting for ninety percent of the labor force
136
in the informal sector. A considerable percentage of regional trade is also
137
informal. Regional informal trade refers to trade in goods and services
across borders conducted by “vulnerable, small, unregistered[,]” and
138
unlicensed traders within a defined threshold and frequency. It “is
estimated to account for up to 30 to 40 [percent] of regional trade in
139
Africa.” According to an UNCTAD report, “[i]nformal cross-border trade
in Africa can contribute up to 43 [percent] of incomes in the region
according to some estimates, and much of this involves women trading on a
140
small scale . . .” For example, “in West and Central Africa, women
141
represent approximately 60 percent of informal traders.” In Southern
Africa, “women comprise an estimated 70 percent of informal cross[142
]border traders.”
The informal trade sector prevails because of the lack of jobs and traderelated opportunities in the formal sector, limited access to credit and
financing to develop and scale businesses, as well as the prohibitive
143
operational and compliance costs of operating in the formal trade sector.
Therefore, the informal sector is often concentrated in goods and services
144
that are not tradable in formal markets due to market entry requirements.
By default, these constraints isolate “some segments of the population from
145
the short-term effects of trade flows.” In doing so, a large percentage of
the population in African countries remains insulated from the impact of

134.
WTO, supra note 21.
135.
See Chazha Ludo Macheng, Women Without Borders: What the AfCFTA Can Do
for Botswana’s Informal Cross Border Traders, AFR. PORTAL (Jan. 13, 2021),
http://www.africaportal.org/features/women-without-borders-what-the-afcfta-can-do-forbotswanas-informal-cross-border-traders.
136.
WTO, supra note 21.
137.
See UNCTAD, supra note 58, at 42.
138.
Macheng, supra note 135 (citing, in part, the Southern African Development
Community’s definition of informal cross-border trade).
139.
UNCTAD, supra note 58, at 42. Informal employment as a whole is estimated to
account for more than sixty-six percent of employment in sub-Saharan Africa. Angus M.
Kathage, Understanding the Informal Economy in African Cities: Recent Evidence from
Greater Kampala, WORLD BANK BLOGS (Mar. 14, 2018), http://blogs.worldbank.org
/africacan/understanding-the-informal-economy-in-african-cities-recent-evidence-fromgreater-kampala (citing the International Labour Organization).
140.
UNCTAD, supra note 58, at 42.
141.
Macheng, supra note 135.
142.
Id.
143.
UNCTAD, supra note 58, at 42.
144.
See Palomba et al., supra note 38, at 51.
145.
Id. at 40.
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146

trade. Limited market access, coupled with the lack of consistency in the
quality of the products and services offered, and limited quality control,
primarily due to skills limitations, prevent informal trade from operating at
the level and scale of formal trade. Spreading knowledge about market
access and opportunities, as well as providing access to finance, are
necessary to allow informal market participants to scale their products to the
147
levels of formal trade markets.
These aforementioned concerns are also prevalent at the level of small
and medium-sized enterprises (“SMEs”). Studies suggest “that in subSaharan Africa[,] the labour productivity of formal firms is four times
higher than that of informal firms” because of the ability of formal firms to
148
scale and specialize in a way that informal operations cannot. Concerns
regarding knowledge about market access and opportunities extend to
SMEs. A recent survey amongst SMEs showed “that only 26.2 percent of
firms in Ghana, the operational seat of the AfCFTA Secretariat, have even
heard of the AfCFTA, much less are well prepared to benefit from its lowto-zero tariffs, price advantages, and other competitive gains afforded when
149
they conduct transactions around the continent under the AfCFTA.”
In summary, non-tariff barriers, especially poor infrastructure and
logistics, and the lack of digital and domesticating payment systems, stand
in the way of the successful implementation and projected impact of the
AfCFTA. Furthermore, access to finance, as well as investment in capacity
and skills training to meet market entry requirements, are imperative to
allow as many people as possible to participate in and benefit from
increased trade flows. Such investments could lay the foundation for the
AfCFTA to achieve its objective of “promot[ing] and attain[ing] sustainable
and inclusive socio-economic development, gender equality and [the]
150
structural transformation of [] State Parties.” Requiring companies to
invest in the development of local skills in the form of local content
requirements, which are further explored in the following section, is one
way to ensure that skills are available to meet the demands of industries in
the local market.
146.
Id. at 51.
147.
This conclusion is based on the author’s analysis and professional experience.
148.
Haas & Delbridge, supra note 131.
149.
Wamkele Mene, Making the AfCFTA Vision Our Reality, in BROOKINGS AFRICA
GROWTH INITIATIVE: FORESIGHT AFRICA 2021 63, 63 (Aloysius Uche Ordu ed., 2021)
(discussing the AfCFTA Secretariat’s efforts to empower innovators and entrepreneurs, create
and share knowledge, and facilitate connections amongst key actors, through the launch of
“AfCFTA Vision, a combination of social advocacy campaigns, innovation contests, and
technology strategies to unify the diverse interest groups on the continent behind the Grand
Vision propelling the AfCFTA.”); Oramah, supra note 35, at 70 (stating that Afrexim has
developed the Trade Information Portal which will improve access to trade information and
predict supply chains across Africa, “helping businesses easily identify potential suppliers of
inputs or distributors of their products in other parts of the continent.”).
150.
AfCFTA, supra note 12, art. 3(e).
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III. Local Content Requirements: A Means to Addressing
Africa’s Productive Capacity Constraints
Limited productivity has been cited as an impediment to regional
integration across the African continent, and enhancing the productive,
distributive, and marketing capacities of African countries is seen as
151
imperative to improving regional production networks and trade. The use
of local content requirements could enable countries to develop and
specialize in specific production activities, fostering or allowing them to
participate in intra-African supply chains. Local content requirements could
also stimulate the development of regional value chains in Africa and
increase the participation of forward and backward linkage suppliers in
African value chains. They could also contribute to diversifying the range
and sophistication of products and services produced by countries, ensuring
that productivity is raised to internationally competitive standards. Finally,
local content requirements would also help address some of the human
capital concerns surrounding the effective implementation of the AfCFTA,
helping build skills that are adaptable and reflective of the market.

A. The Role of Local Content Requirements and Policy Considerations
for Structuring Them
Local content is “the local resources a project or business utilises or
152
develops along its value chain while investing in a host country.” Its use is
promulgated through requirements that secure a given percentage of local
inputs, thereby promoting the development of an intermediate input
industry. For the purposes of this article, local content requirements are
defined as provisions that require that “a given percentage of domestic value
153
added or domestic components be embodied in a specified final product.”
Local content requirements can come in the form of government policies or
legislation, as well as contractual obligations in agreements between
companies and governments. Local content requirements are increasingly
prevalent in contracts where governments are a party, especially where
154
natural resources and strategic projects are concerned. Governments are
151.
Integration Index Report, supra note 76, at 12.
152.
DFID, supra note 122, at 5 (citing OECD, Collaborative Strategies for In-Country
Shared Value Creation: Framework for Extractive Projects 24 (2016) https://www.oecd.org
/dev/Framework_Public-Private_Collaboration_FINAL.pdf).
153.
Chilenye Nwapi, A Survey of the Literature on Local Content Policies in the Oil
and Gas Industry in East Africa, U. CALGARY SCH. PUB. POL’Y, Apr. 2016 2 (citing Gene M.
Grossman, The Theory of Domestic Content Protection and Content Preference, 96 Q.J.
ECONOMICS 583 (1981)).
154.
See, e.g., Petroleum (Local Content and Local Participation) Regulations 2013 art.
3, L.I. 2204 (Ghana) (requiring that local content is a part of contract or license holder’s
activities). Tanzania requires international oil companies to employ Tanzanians having
appropriate qualifications. See Ramdoo, supra note 37, at 4. Botswana requires mineral
concession holders to employ citizens of Botswana to the ‘maximum extent’ possible. See id.

80

Michigan Journal of International Law

[Vol. 43:61

increasingly using their equity participation in projects as leverage for
155
compelling a greater use of local content. Local content clauses are also
more frequently contentious sticking points in contract negotiations as
countries become more aware of the potential benefits of local content
156
requirements.
In some cases, local content requirements can be embedded in
contracts, or bidding rules as a precondition for winning contracts, “or
embedded more indirectly in regulation and tax regimes through [the]
provision of incentives to local industries or to other companies that support
157
local participation.” The implementation of local content requirements
could be aimed at “raising the growth and competitiveness of large (such as
manufacturing) or specific (such as the auto industry) sectors of the
economy or the growth of certain key activities (such as research and
158
development, [and] exports).” Local content requirements could be broad
or more limited to the sectors or products that a country wishes to grow.
Ultimately, local content requirements “are undertaken to enable countries
to maximize the gains of [FDI] through the promotion of local participation
159
in FDI and the use of local raw materials by investors.” The expectation is
that they will result in sector and industry development and economic
diversification through the use of local raw materials and services,
technology transfer, training, and employment opportunities, thereby
increasing local participation and allowing a country to reap the benefits of
a contractual arrangement beyond the life of the resource, the project asset,
or the contract. Essentially, the goal of local content requirements is to
160
‘“strengthen the productive structure of a particular national economy.’”
On an individual level, local content is a means to improving livelihoods
through opportunities for employment and skills development, and the use
161
of locally produced goods and services. At a national level, local content
enables domestic companies to develop and compete regionally and
internationally.
The use of local content requirements spans decades and continents, in
both developed and developing economies, across a range of sectors, and
155.
This conclusion is based on the author’s analysis and professional experience.
156.
This conclusion is based on the author’s analysis and professional experience.
157.
Nwapi, supra note 153, at 3–4.
158.
Chilenye Nwapi, The “Local” in Local Content Requirements in the Oil and Gas
and Mining Sectors in Developing Countries, 8 LAW & DEV. REV. 187, 190 (2015).
159.
Nwapi, supra note 153, at 2.
160.
Id. at 3 (citing Alberto Melo & Andrés Rodríguez-Clare, Productive Development
Policies and Supporting Institutions in Latin America and the Caribbean 5 (Inter-Am. Dev.
Bank Rsch. Dep’t, Working Paper No. C-106, 2006)).
161.
A growing body of evidence demonstrates that deliberate community involvement
“‘can and does influence the local economy and is capable of improving the quality of life for
local residents.’” Id. at 11 (citing SEAN MARKEY, JOHN T. PIERCE, KELLY VODDEN & MARK
ROSELAND, SECOND GROWTH: COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN RURAL BRITISH
COLUMBIA, at xiii (Vancouver: Univ. B.C. Press, 2005).
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appears to have grown in recent years with almost 100 such requirements
162
proposed or implemented between 2008 and 2013. As UNCTAD has
stated concerning the use of local content policies,
[n]o country has made the arduous journey from widespread rural
poverty to post-industrial prosperity without employing targeted
and selective government policies that seek to shift the production
structure towards new types of activities and sectors with higher
163
productivity, better paid jobs and greater technological potential.
Although thought of more often in the context of extractive resources,
local content requirements can apply to multiple sectors and investments.
Local content requirements in the extractives sector are also likely to have
spillover effects to other sectors as they spur the development of products
and skills applicable across a range of sectors and industries. Local inputs
can take the form of labor, materials, or parts, “derived from the domestic
economy and utilized in the production process for the purpose of adding
164
value to [a] local economy.” The objectives of local content requirements
generally center on the creation of backward and forward linkages such as
“the development of other (or new) economic sectors using the skills,
capabilities and infrastructure developed [along] . . . industry value
165
chain[s].” The purpose of creating linkages is to boost nascent industries
through the provision of local job opportunities and skills training, transfer
166
of technology, and an increase in ownership control. Through training
programs, local content requirements could also ease worker mobility across
167
industries, thereby promoting employment. As previously stated, through
such measures, local content requirements ensure that the country or
community where the investment is taking place reaps the benefits of the
investment beyond the life of the resource and project asset and maximizes
the benefits of FDI.
Local content requirements can also help provide companies with what
has been termed a “social license” to operate within the communities in
168
which they invest. As communities have access to training opportunities,
see jobs created, and see their local products included in industry value
chains, there is a demonstrated value for people as opposed to solely a value

162.
Cathleen Cimino, Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. Schott, A Proposed Code to
Discipline Local Content Requirements 1 (Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ., Pol’y Brief No.
PB14-6, 2014).
163.
DFID, supra note 122, at 4 (citing UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report, at
XIII, UNCTAD/TDR/2016 (Sept. 22, 2016)).
164.
Rabiu Ado, Local Content Policy and the WTO Rules of Trade-Related Investment
Measures (TRIMS): The Pros and Cons, 2 INT’L. J. BUS. MGMT. STUDS. 137, 138 (2013).
165.
IGF, supra note 85, at ix.
166.
See Nwapi, supra note 153, at 3.
167.
See id. at 15.
168.
Id. at 11; Nwapi, supra note 158, at 188.
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for money for projects. This is especially important where large strategic
projects and natural resources are involved, as the localities of these projects
are likely to be the most affected by the activities of the project. This is also
especially important for projects where locals are among the end-users of
the project, and the success and viability of the project is dependent on its
170
use-generated payments. Through local job creation and value addition,
171
local content could improve company-community relations.
Giving
consideration to the communities could also help alleviate the effects and
disruptions caused by the investment and is likely to minimize the potential
172
for conflict or obstruction which could halt a project’s advancement. The
use of local content could also allow an investor to differentiate itself from
other investors that are less likely to source, mobilize, and develop local
skills and inputs and who often bring their own supply firms to the countries
173
in which they investment. In doing so, an investor would also be
supporting a more sustainable form of development by facilitating skills and
private sector development.
Certain factors need to be considered when structuring local content
requirements. These include addressing the question of what is meant by
174
“local,” by determining whether the requirement will compel the use of
resources that are local to the area of the investment or whether it will
require national participation. Another consideration is whether the
requirement is intended to boost competitiveness within a country or across
175
countries. In terms of the substantive elements of the requirements, a
government might consider what form of increased local participation the

169.
See Nwapi, supra note 153, at 11 (citing MARKEY ET AL., supra note 161, at xiii)
(stating that “[A] growing body of evidence . . . demonstrates that deliberate community
action can and does influence the local economy and is capable of improving the quality of
life for local residents.”).
170.
For example, the construction of toll-roads are projects where the success of the
project is dependent on the local end-users. This conclusion is based on the author’s analysis
and professional experience.
171.
This conclusion is based on the author’s analysis and professional experience.
172.
See Nwapi, supra note 153, at 11 (citing World Bank, Human Capital for the Oil,
Gas and Minerals Industries, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND SKILLS FOR AFRICA’S
DEVELOPMENT 1, 4 (March. 2014)) (stating that “[l]ocal employment is consistently the top
concern of communities located near extraction projects, and often a central issue behind
disputes, grievance and conflict. More local jobs result in more support for projects.”).
173.
See MIKE MORRIS , RAPHAEL KAPLINSKY & DAVID KAPLAN, ONE THING LEADS
TO ANOTHER: PROMOTING INDUSTRIALISATION BY MAKING THE MOST OF THE COMMODITY
BOOM IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 197 (2012) (discussing the approach of Chinese investors in
Africa of using Chinese-owned locally based suppliers and its impact on technology transfer
and the development of linkages).
174.
See Nwapi, supra note 153, at 8 (stating that “[m]ost local content laws do not
define explicitly the term ‘local’ in local content. What local means can only be deciphered in
their definitions of local content.”).
175.
See id.
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176

requirement is intended to generate. Is the intention to focus on skills
generation and to therefore include a requirement of local training and
employment? Is the intention to increase the participation of local
industries, thereby requiring the local procurement of goods and services?
Or is the intention to enhance broader economic diversification by
promoting linkages to other sectors? Governments should define “local” in a
single dimension, thereby not imposing multiple onerous requirements on
177
businesses, which could be difficult to comply with. There are three main
policy considerations when arriving at the definition of “local”: (1)
178
geography—the geographic delineations of the business activity; (2) value
179
addition—the country of origin of the value addition; and (3) ownership—
180
the level of participation of locals as owners of equity or as employees.
Ultimately, it is important for a government to align the requirements with a
country’s industrialization policy objectives whilst assessing what is
domestically feasible and what would not hamper foreign direct investment.
In defining what is meant by “local,” it is important for policymakers to
strike a balance between allowing those most affected by the investment to
benefit and promoting supplier diversification across the affected country. It
is also important to balance providing opportunities to the most skilled for
roles requiring technical and managerial expertise, especially where training
is provided, with wider skills development to ensure that those opportunities
do not result in the development of skills in a concentrated region of a
country when the skills would benefit the greater economy. Likewise, the
definition of “local” should align with policy objectives. For example, if a
“government aims to increase domestic employment and foster skills
improvements[,] then the focus should be on domestic value addition, not
181
solely on business ownership.”
Furthermore, the definition of “local” should align, to the extent
182
possible, with “rules of origin” under regional agreements, such as the
AfCFTA, to reap the benefits of the large market the AfCFTA creates. As
with rules of origin, local content determines “the economic nationality as
opposed to [solely] the geographic[] nationality of a given good[,]” product,
183
or service. Additionally, local content requirements, like rules of origin,
“affect the range of local intermediate goods that are necessary to finalize
176.
This conclusion is based on the author’s analysis and professional experience.
177.
See DFID, supra note 122, at 7.
178.
IGF, supra note 85, at viii.
179.
Id.
180.
Id.
181.
DFID, supra note 122, at 31.
182.
Rules of origin are the rules used to determine the country of origin of goods.
UNCTAD, supra note 58, at 18.
183.
See id. (citing World Customs Organization, Rules of Origin Handbook 6 (2012),
http://www.wcoomd.org/~/media/wco/public/global/pdf/topics/origin/overview/originhandbook/rules-of-origin-handbook.pdf (discussing the role of rules of origin).
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184

the production of a given good.” Furthermore, as with rules of origin, in
developing local content policies, governments need to strike a balance
between making the policies too restrictive and too broad when defining
what constitutes local content. Overly restrictive policies could curb
entrepreneurial and sector development as entrepreneurs struggle to meet
the value-added threshold—especially in markets with very limited capacity
185
and production—thereby negating the intended benefit. In contrast, overly
broad policies could prevent the growth of local businesses as foreign
186
products with minimal local inputs pass as local content. As with rules of
origin, local content requirements could also look to gradually increase local
187
input requirements as skills and market capabilities increase in a country.
In determining the substantive elements of the local content
requirements, it is important to assess to what extent local skills or inputs
meet industry needs, what targets are reasonable, and what gaps need to be
188
addressed. It is also important to assess opportunities for businesses and
employment creation, and what parallel initiatives may be needed on the
189
part of government. In doing so, regulatory bodies need to “distinguish
between capacity that is available but currently limited and that can be
enhanced, and capacity that is simply not available or so limited that to
insist on its use will cause significant economic loss” to the country and
190
investors. Where local capacity is lacking, imposing stringent conditions
may not achieve the best outcome, as they may frustrate the implementation
of projects and deter FDI.
One approach to address skills capacity is to focus on skills
development through the required training of locals and the development of
training programs complementing government efforts, an example of which
is Namibia’s Petroleum Training and Education Fund, also known as
Petrofund. A registered trust established in 1993, Petrofund is a statutory
body of the government mandated to build capacity for the petroleum
191
industry in Namibia. It is funded by petroleum license holders who are
required by their licensing agreements to contribute an agreed-upon amount
to enable the government to build and deploy the human capacity required

184.
Id. at 45.
185.
See id. at 46 (discussing the balance to be struck in developing rules of origin).
186.
See id.
187.
See infra pp. 83–84 (discussing the approach of adjusting local content
requirements as market capabilities increase).
188.
IGF, supra note 85, at vii; DFID, supra note 122, at 17.
189.
DFID, supra note 122, at 17.
190.
Nwapi, supra note 153, at 13 (citing Ike Oguine, Nigerian Content in the Nigerian
Petroleum Industry: Legal and Policy Issues, 29 J. ENERGY & NAT’L RES. L. 409, 418
(2011)).
191.
See Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act (Act No. 2/1991) §§ 14(1)(b),
14(2) (Namib.); see also ABOUT US, PETROFUND, http://www.petrofund.org/main/index.php
/about-us/about-us (last visited Dec. 5, 2021).
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192

in the industry for the direct benefit of operators. As a result of Petrofund,
scholarships are provided to Namibians for tertiary education in the fields of
mathematics, science, technology, and engineering, allowing Namibians to
assume professional roles in sectors where Namibia lacks adequate
193
manpower. Petrofund also promotes awareness of these professional
fields and enhances the quality of teachers at secondary schools in these
194
fields. Overall, Petrofund’s initiatives are developing skills in Namibia’s
priority sectors.
Another example is a $15 million USD training center in Ghana set up
195
in 2013 by the Jubilee Partners. The initiative is a “public-private
initiative aimed at addressing the skills gap in technical and vocational
196
education in the oil and gas industry.” The initiative is complemented by a
local content fund established by the Ghana National Petroleum
197
Corporation and a $4.7 million USD fund established by the World Bank
198
“to support training in relevant engineering fields.” Ghana’s Local
Content Fund, created by statute and established by the Ghana National
Petroleum Corporation in 2016, aims to provide funding to local companies
for training, education, and research and development in the petroleum
199
sector. The Fund also provides loans on a competitive basis for local
small and medium-scale enterprises to support their ability to participate in
200
the petroleum sector. Ghana’s Local Content Fund is funded in part by
201
petroleum license holders and their subcontractors.
Contracting parties can also consider agreeing to the incremental
inclusion of local content so that as a country and its investors “continue[]
to invest in [the] training of local professionals, the level of local content
required of companies can be increased gradually, in proportion to a
reasonably projected increase in the availability of qualified local
202
professionals and firms to take up the opportunities.” Investors could
argue that employing locals may be challenging due to available capacity
and costs. The concerns about available capacity can be addressed by
incremental inclusion. To address the argument concerning the potentially
higher cost of hiring locals, contractual local content requirements often
provide that local employees should be hired provided that they are not
192.
Id.
193.
See PETROFUND, supra note 191.
194.
Id.
195.
Nwapi, supra note 153, at 14.
196.
Id.
197.
Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act, (Act No. 919/2016) § 64 (Ghana)
[hereinafter Ghana Petroleum Act]; Nwapi, supra note 153, at 14.
198.
Nwapi, supra note 153, at 14.
199.
Ghana Petroleum Act, supra note 197, § 65(2)(a); PETROFUND, supra note 191.
200.
Ghana Petroleum Act, supra note 197, § 65(2)(b).
201.
Id. § 66(1).
202.
Nwapi, supra note 153, at 14.
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more costly than equally competitive non-local candidates, typically
203
determined by an agreed upon ceiling. Some local content requirements
applicable to investor contracts, pursuant to a country’s regulations or
model contracts, may also impose more suggestive than prescriptive
employment requirements. Such requirements could address capacity and
cost concerns and facilitate an incremental inclusion of local employees. For
example, in Botswana, investors holding mineral concessions are required
to employ citizens of Botswana to the “maximum extent” possible, and to
204
provide training to the local labor force. Another example is the case of
Tanzania, where international oil companies “are required to employ
Tanzanian citizens having appropriate qualifications to the maximum extent
205
possible.” The use of the term “maximum extent” by both Botswana and
Tanzania, and “appropriate qualifications” by Tanzania, is more suggestive
and thereby allows for considerations for capacity availability and
feasibility while still promoting local employment and skills development.
Regardless of the approach taken, it is important that the requirements are
known and transparent, allowing investors to calculate potential costs into
their investments.
To address the procurement capacity concerns, countries can develop
industry-certified databases of local businesses, thereby making it easier for
206
companies to search for local companies for local inputs. Such a database
would reduce the transaction costs for investors seeking local suppliers. A
certification process or pre-qualification process could also help assure
investors that the companies meet a certain standard of practice, thereby
augmenting the effect of having such a database and further reducing
207
transaction costs. A database would not only help facilitate connections
208
but also help ensure that potential business opportunities are seized. For
example, Ghana has set up a “Common Qualification System” in the
209
petroleum sector. The objective of the Common Qualification System is
“to serve as the sole system for the registration and pre-qualification of local
210
content in the petroleum industry[,]” verifying contractor’s capacities,
capabilities, and local content strength, as well as tracking and monitoring
211
their performance.

203.
This conclusion is based on the author’s analysis and professional experience.
204.
Mines and Minerals Act (1999) Cap. (66:01), art. 12(2)(3) (Bots.).
205.
Ramdoo, supra note 37, at 4; Tanzania Model Production Sharing Agreement
(2013), art. 21(a) (Tanz.).
206.
DFID, supra note 122, at 12.
207.
Id.
208.
Id. at 13.
209.
See Petroleum (Local Content and Local Participation) Regulations 2013, L.I.
2204, art. 38(1) (Ghana) [hereinafter Ghana Local Content Regulations].
210.
Id. art. 38(1).
211.
Id. art. 38(2).
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To mitigate concerns about the availability of inputs to meet
procurement needs, parties can consider incremental approaches to
promoting local content as suggested as an approach to address skills
capacity concerns. Contracting parties can generally outline the stages of
212
projects as they tend to be consistent within sectors. Furthermore,
investors in many sectors are often required to provide work plans, which
213
include procurement plans. By doing so, parties can determine what goods
and services are required at different stages and develop procurement plans
accordingly. The development of procurement plans could then allow the
host country to have foresight as to what services and goods it has to
provide, which it could in turn use to determine what sectors to invest in to
ensure that the requisite local goods and services are developed in time.
Such actions can be even more effective in sectors typified by extensive
supply chain networks and would contribute to the diversification of
production and services provided in the host economy, while helping
guarantee the market access required for local entrepreneurs to develop their
214
businesses.
For example, in Ghana, the government requires “mining companies to
submit five year local procurement plans with targets and detailed support
215
for suppliers, and plans must be revised each year based on results.”
Australia has achieved success using similar methods in the mining sector
and “uses the information provided to identify supplying opportunities and
216
steer policy and support.” Such plans are, of course, more effective when
governments and other actors make a concerted effort to monitor and direct
217
efforts based on the plans.
A potential concern with procurement requirements involves the
concept of elite capture. Elite capture refers to the partnership between
foreign firms and local firms, where the local firm will bid under the guise
of local content to obtain a local contract while the production work will be
218
substantially performed by a foreign company. Ultimately, in such cases,
219
the foreign companies will obtain the primary benefit. Alternatively, local
elites may partner with domestic economic entrepreneurs involved in local
content markets, extracting profits from entrepreneurs in support of elite
220
interests. One way to combat both of these issues is to require and conduct

212.
This analysis is based on the author’s analysis and professional experience.
213.
See, e.g., Ghana Petroleum Act, supra note 197, § 27 (describing the development
and operation plan that petroleum license holders in Ghana are required to produce).
214.
This analysis is based on the author’s analysis and professional experience.
215.
DFID, supra note 122, at 11.
216.
Id.
217.
See IGF, supra note 85, at x.
218.
See Nwapi, supra note 153, at 21–22.
219.
Id.
220.
See id.
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due diligence on company ownership and shareholding structures. It is
also important to establish “adequate systems of information sharing and
222
transparency around local content.”

B. Local Content Requirements, the Development of Linkages and
Industries, and the Rise of Diversification
Local content policies targeting the development of skills, goods, and
223
services can spur the development of linkages. Linkages generally come
in three forms: (1) those resulting in employment and skills development
224
and the transfer of technology, also referred to as horizontal linkages; (2)
those creating demand for inputs from local suppliers, local sourcing, and
225
procurements, also referred to as backward linkages; and (3) those
increasing the supply of inputs to local producers and value addition,
226
referred to as forward linkages. All forms of linkages are intertwined.
Demand-side policies “focus on creating a demand for local procurement of
227
goods and services.” In contrast, “[o]n the supply side, the focus is on
building the capacity of local suppliers to bring them up to global standards
on price, quality, and reliability. Both types of policies are typically needed;
supplier development helps to ensure that demand-side policies do not
228
require more than local firms are able to supply[,]”
while skills
229
development is the foundation for all forms of local content measures.
With respect to employment, linkages occur through training and
experience gained by local employees, which could ultimately benefit local
230
firms if employees subsequently join local firms. The skills developed
could also be used to serve the needs of other sectors. However, as investors
generally invest in training specific to their investment’s training needs,
231
linkages through employment could be limited.
Linkages can be
effectively developed through policies promoting the use of inputs from
local suppliers, thereby promoting economic diversification and resulting in
local companies improving production standards and practices in their
232
efforts to meet the demands and standards of foreign companies. Such
activity could also help improve efficiency, provide exposure to new
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

See id. at 22.
DFID, supra note 122, at 19.
See supra p. 18 (discussing the definition of linkages).
See DFID, supra note 122, at 5–6, 10; see Nwapi, supra note 153, at 15.
Id.
Id.
IGF, supra note 85, at viii.
Id.
See id.
Nwapi, supra note 153, at 15.
Id.
Id.
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technologies, and result in the development of new products and services,
which could help spur innovation and the production of more sophisticated
products. Some argue that “the largest single determinant of [gross domestic
product (“GDP”)] growth in both developed and developing economies is
233
innovation.” Increased complexity in production, driven by innovation, is
234
typically tied to higher value addition.
As countries seek to promote linkages as part of their industrialization
policies, they must be strategic and ensure alignment between their policies,
the nature of the conditions they impose, and the firms they wish to attract.
Policymakers should develop policies that not only attract FDI, but also
allow knowledge and skills to develop and stay in the host country. Like
many policy objectives, local content requirements cannot operate
effectively in isolation. Countries should define their focus based on
priorities, needs, availability, and circumstances, and they should
complement their local content objectives with the requisite support
235
measures and mechanisms.
In the case of Europe, Norway presents a classic example of the
significant impact of applying local content requirements on the
development of linkages in its petroleum sector. In 1972, “Norway passed
the Royal Decree, requiring all operations to source from Norwegian
companies unless the Norwegian suppliers were not competitive in terms of
236
quality, service[,] and price.” Subsequently, the 1985 Petroleum Act
required the use of local content provisions when allocating licenses in the
237
North Sea. As a result of these measures, “Norway provided preferential
treatment to Norwegian companies in all bidding rounds between 1974 and
1994. The licenses also included provisions requiring the transfer of skills
238
and technologies to Norway’s infant petroleum industry.” Norway also
employed policies that required multinational corporations to integrate
domestic firms in large projects and fostered joint ventures and cooperation
239
agreements between domestic and foreign firms.
When Norway first discovered offshore oil in 1969, it did not have the
240
capacity to supply offshore rigs. However, within a span of approximately
thirty years, during which it introduced local content requirements, it had

233.
Hippolyte Fofack, A Competitive Africa: Economic Integration Could Make the
Continent a Global Player, INT’L MONETARY FUND: FIN. & DEV., Dec. 2018, at 50; see also
UNCTAD, supra note 58, at 23–24.
234.
See UNCTAD, supra note 58, at 23–24.
235.
See Nwapi, supra note 158, at 198.
236.
LISE JOHNSON, SPACE FOR LOCAL CONTENT POLICIES AND STRATEGIES: A
CRUCIAL TIME TO REVISIT AN OLD DEBATE 9 (2016), https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu
/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1015&context=sustainable_investment_staffpubs.
237.
Id.
238.
Id.
239.
Id. at 10.
240.
Id. at 9.
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developed the industries required to supply the petroleum sector. After
just thirty years, “companies were sourcing more than 50% of capital inputs
and more than 80% of operations and maintenance inputs from Norwegian
242
firms.” Furthermore, the expertise acquired “enabled Norwegian firms to
expand into export markets, with exports comprising nearly half of their
243
sales by the early 2000s.” Norway stopped imposing local content
requirements when it joined the European Economic Area in 1994, which as
a condition of membership did not allow the application of preferential
244
treatment policies. However, Norway’s backward linkages had already
245
been developed by then.
Local content measures can also be initiated by the private sector. A
notable example of local content initiatives and the development of linkages
on the part of the private sector is Anglo American Corporation’s Zimele
Enterprise Program in South Africa. The Program is comprised of a fund,
Anglo Zimele, which focuses on supporting entrepreneurs from historically
246
disadvantaged communities and those most impacted by mining activities.
The fund was developed “to provide financial and hands-on technical
support to entrepreneurs in mining-impacted communities and labour247
sending areas in South Africa[,]” with the aim of developing the ability of
SMEs “to meet Anglo American’s procurement or processing
248
requirements.”
From its inception, Anglo Zimele has focused on providing
opportunities and resources to support entrepreneurs who, due to the
absence of the required collateral, limited market access, and other viability
249
concerns, have limited access to traditional start-up capital. Anglo
American invests in the companies with an eye toward making them
250
financially sustainable. The fund provides entrepreneurs with start-up
251
capital as well as guaranteed market access. In doing so, it has helped
develop local businesses, generate employment, and drive social and
252
economic development in economically marginalized communities. In
241.
Id.
242.
Id.
243.
Id.
244.
Id. at 10.
245.
Id.
246.
AFR. NAT’L RES. CTR., AFR. DEV. BANK, ANGLO AMERICAN CORPORATION’S
ZIMELE ENTERPRISE PROGRAM: A CASE STUDY 9 (2016), http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin
/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/anrc/Anglo_american_corporations_Zimele_enterprise
_program.pdf.
247.
Id.
248.
Id.
249.
See id.
250.
See id. at 12.
251.
See id.
252.
See id. at 9–12.
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turn, this has helped diversify Anglo American’s supplier base and drive
253
competitiveness amongst suppliers. Since its inception, Anglo Zimele has
concluded over “2,750 transactions and invested over ZAR1.4 billion
[South African rand] in businesses in South Africa that have a combined
254
turnover of over ZAR6 billion [South African rand]” as of 2016. In
addition, “businesses supported by Zimele have also contributed to the
creation of 38,000 jobs in mining-affected communities and labour-supply
255
areas across South Africa” as of 2016.
Local content proponents assert “that countries–particularly developing
countries–should be able to implement [local content requirements] to
256
protect and strengthen infant industries,” whose firms would otherwise
have to compete with foreign firms and may not yet be able to compete on
257
the global market.
The creation of linkages, whether through the
development of skills to produce certain products or conduct certain
services, or through the development of local products through requirements
for the use of local inputs, gives rise to systems of supply chains where
value to goods and services can be added at the local level and then
subsequently exported.
Local content requirements also allow countries to develop expertise at
providing certain services and producing certain goods that are integral to
their local industries and domestic economies and, in doing so, develop a
258
comparative advantage.
Furthermore, competitive pressures provide
incentives to innovate and stimulate the growth of entrepreneurial activity.
Countries could develop specializations that become part of production or
service chains through their value addition, which may be easier to attain
than producing all parts of a product or a full range of services, especially in
a globally competitive environment where global value chains are very
259
much established. But to do so, “certain preconditions such as sufficient
260
levels of capacity, quality, and efficiency are required.” Requiring and
investing in local content can help develop these capacities and address
these gaps. Value chains could be developed at the regional level, resulting
in “lower transit costs and shorter supply chains[,]” as sourcing or
manufacturing would be conducted closer to the target regional export
261
markets.

253.
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255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

See id. at 12.
Id. at 11.
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JOHNSON, supra note 236, at 7.
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Such activity could also eventually result in increased integration into
global value chains. Whether through deepening ties into global value
chains or through developing value chains at the regional level, local
content requirements may “help foster structural transformation, export
262
diversification, and the possibility to absorb technology and skills.” Using
local content requirements to spur the development of the production of
goods and services is an effective way to leverage FDI to address supply263
side constraints. It would also result in the creation of job opportunities,
and more sustainable and inclusive growth. Such actions would support the
development of regional trade flows, which in turn would “better shelter the
264
region from exogenous external shocks” and could act as a form of
265
insurance from disruptions of global trade, or a form of insulation, the
necessity of which became apparent during the COVID-19 pandemic and
the resulting trade and supply-chain disruptions.
The growth of many Asian economies provide recent examples of how
local content policies can play a significant role in developing local
industries and regional value chains and, in turn, foster increased trade
within a region. The Asian success stories, such as those of Singapore,
South Korea, and Taiwan, are attributed to industrial policies that focused
on creating backward linkages from foreign investors to domestic suppliers.
These backward linkages placed an emphasis on local content and the
266
transfer of technology—often through joint ventures. They also developed
production engineering skills to use imported technologies efficiently,
absorbing new production technologies that they successfully plugged into
global production networks formed by multinational corporations as well as
267
local suppliers. Such industrial policy tools and objectives were coupled
268
with a variety of tax incentives and investment subsidies. These actions

262.
IMF, supra note 88, at 59.
263.
This conclusion is based on the author’s analysis and professional experience.
264.
IMF, supra note 88, at 62.
265.
Fofack, supra note 233, at 49.
266.
See generally Masahiro Kawai & Ganeshan Wignaraja, Asian FTAs: Trends,
Prospects, and Challenges 3 (Asian Dev. Bank Econ., Working Paper No. 226, 2010)
(discussing how the use of advanced technologies in conjunction with local suppliers provided
an environment for Asian firms to be able to compete internationally); Jostein Hauge, Should
the African Lion Learn from the Asian Tigers? A Comparative-Historical Study of FDIOriented Industrial Policy in Ethiopia, South Korea and Taiwan, 40 THIRD WORLD Q. 2071,
2073–76, 2080–83 (2019) (highlighting how industrial policies carefully designed to create
backward linkages increase local content and move technology from foreign firms to the
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Kawai & Wignaraja, supra note 266, at 3.
268.
See Ha-Joon Chang & Kiryl Zach, Industrial Development in Asia: Trends in
Industrialization and Industrial Policy Experiences of Developing Asia 12–15 (U.N. Univ.
World Inst. for Dev. Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 2018/120, 2018).
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were accompanied by investment in infrastructure, logistics, and human
269
capital to attract FDI, which in turn also facilitated trade.
As innovation took place, there was a shift from labor-intensive to more
270
technology-intensive exports. A “long period of market-driven expansion
of trade and FDI followed, during which Asia increasingly became a global
271
production center with deep and diverse technological capabilities.” As a
result of such measures, “three of the world’s richest economies—in terms
of per capita income—are now in Asia: Japan, the Republic of Korea, and
272
Singapore.” Furthermore, “[f]alling regional trade barriers and logistics
costs, technological progress, and rising factor costs at core production
locations spurred the decentralization of production networks to the most
273
cost-effective locations.” This resulted in the development of regional
value chains. As a result, trade within Asia grew from thirty-seven percent
274
in 1980 to fifty-six percent in 2008. Similar policies have been applied in
275
other Southeast Asian countries besides Singapore. As a result, from the
inception of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”) Free
Trade Area in 1993 (a predecessor to the ASEAN Economic Community
established in 2015), intra-ASEAN trade grew from $82 billion USD to
276
$598 billion USD in 2011. Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand
account for the bulk of this trade, “with Singapore alone accounting for 34.4
277
[percent].”
In conclusion, “for the AfCFTA to have a transformative effect on
member countries, it would need to spur the development of the nascent
278
supply chain[s] on the continent.” One way to do so is through the
application of local content requirements by State Parties within their
countries in the context of FDI. By applying local content requirements and
taking advantage of the opportunity presented by the AfCFTA, African
economies could transition “from low productivity and labour[-]intensive
activities to higher productivity and skills[-]intensive industrial and service
269.
See Kawai & Wignaraja, supra note 266, at 3.
270.
Id.
271.
Id.
272.
Id.
273.
Id.
274.
Id.
275.
See id. at 3, 6; see generally Chang & Zach, supra note 268, at 12–15 (discussing
industrial policy measures in Korea, Malaysia, and China that contributed to industrialization
in these countries, China and Korea being non-ASEAN countries but within the Asia region).
276.
Siow Yue Chia, The ASEAN Economic Community: Progress, Challenges, and
Prospects 25 (Asian Dev. Bank Inst., Working Paper No. 440, 2013); see also Wolfgang
Lehmacher, The ASEAN Economic Community: What You Need to Know, WORLD ECON. F.,
(May 31, 2016), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/05/asean-economic-communitywhat-you-need-to-know/ (stating that less conservative estimates place the growth in trade
among ASEAN countries between 2007 and 2014 at a value of nearly $1 trillion USD).
277.
Chia, supra note 276, at 24–25.
278.
ABREGO, ET AL., supra note 19, at 11.
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activities – which in turn will produce better paid jobs and make an impact
279
on poverty.” Such developments would align with the objectives of the
AfCFTA, which include the promotion of “industrial development through
280
diversification and regional value chain development” and enhancing “the
competitiveness of the economies of State Parties within the continent and
281
the global market.” Local content requirements could also produce an
added value for the communities that businesses engage in through training,
job creation, and increased production activities. In turn, showing a value
for the people and the communities through the use of local content is likely
to contribute to the creation of a successful investment climate.

IV. An Argument for a Regional Approach to Local Content
Requirements
Does the AfCFTA present an opportunity to develop a regional
approach to local content requirements? Could such a strategy be more
effective to achieve the intended goals of local content requirements? With
different levels of capacity and technology, and a range of productivity
levels and outputs, what implementation structures would be the most
effective? A regional approach to local content requirements could provide
a stronger bargaining position for AfCFTA State Parties when negotiating
local content requirements with non-regional investors. The rationale behind
a regional approach is that “the comparative advantages that each country
282
enjoys can be strategically mobilized to meet the supply needs” of sectors
in the region and thereby further develop those sectors. Regional local
content approaches could help develop complementarity in production
structures, including in the form of regional value chains, as countries could
participate in different steps of the value chain of products or services in
accordance with their specializations and comparative advantage.
Essentially, “an Africa[]-wide framework can serve as a continental
coordinating mechanism to support sub-regional frameworks by linking the
sub-regions together and creating opportunities for cross-pollination of
283
resources.”
A key consideration for a regional approach to local content
requirements would be relevance, allowing countries to draw on skills that
284
are relevant to their industrial policy priorities. Other key considerations
include accessibility, referring to the bureaucratic and structural bottlenecks,
both in terms of infrastructure and policies, that may make the movement of

279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

Signé, Africa Has a New Free Trade Area, supra note 1.
AfCFTA, supra note 12, art. 3(g).
Id. art. 3(f).
Nwapi, supra note 153, at 19.
Id. at 19–20.
See id. at 20.
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285

workers and goods difficult. Equity considerations would guard against
the effects of the possible domination of weaker countries by stronger
286
countries.
All of these issues are consistent with considerations
concerning the efficacy of the AfCFTA and, if addressed, could help
develop an effective regional approach to local content requirements and
thereby promote the economic diversification needed for countries to fully
participate at the level of intraregional trade envisioned by the AfCFTA. A
regional approach to local content requirements could also enable
“neighboring countries facing similar challenges to pull their institutional
287
resources together to enhance the local capacity of each country.”

V. Local Content Requirements and International Trade Law
Considerations
The regulation of the use of local content requirements stems from
international and bilateral agreements. Therefore, in developing local
content requirements, it is important for policymakers to consider the
international obligations arising from such agreements. Policymakers must
assess which local content tools conflict with international legal obligations,
namely WTO agreements, regional agreements, and bilateral agreements.
This section focuses on the implications of the WTO agreements on local
content requirements in the context of FDI as the agreements apply more
288
broadly to the WTO’s Members. Furthermore, almost all of the WTO’s
African Members have ratified the AfCFTA, thirty-four out of the forty-four
African WTO Members, with ratification or parliamentary approval for
289
ratification pending in the remaining ten countries. Additionally, “all nine
African countries seeking to accede to the WTO are signatories [to] the
290
AfCFTA.” Therefore, AfCFTA State Parties are significantly impacted by
the restrictions imposed on local content requirements by the WTO
agreements. The WTO agreements specifically at issue are the GATT, the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”), the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (“ASCM”), and the Agreement on
291
Trade-Related Investment Measures (“TRIMs Agreement”).
These
agreements uphold the principle of “National Treatment,” which requires
WTO Members to grant one another the same treatment as they accord their
285.
See id.
286.
Id.
287.
Id. at 21.
288.
A Member refers to a state that is a party to the WTO agreements. See Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art. II, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S.
154 [hereinafter WTO Agreement]; GATT, supra note 114, Annex 1A.
289.
See Members and Observers, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis
_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited July 18, 2021); TRALAC, supra note 13.
290.
WTO, supra note 21.
291.
See Nwapi, supra note 158, at 193–94.
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292

nationals. This section will provide an overview of how the AfCFTA
relates to the WTO framework and its agreements. Although briefly
discussing the restrictions bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”) impose on
local content requirements, this section focuses on the aforementioned key
WTO agreements that impact the use of local content requirements,
assessing how they regulate local content requirements. Following an
overview of the restrictions WTO agreements impose on the use of local
content requirements, this section assesses the available policy space for
local content requirements in the context of the WTO agreements. This
section concludes by demonstrating the potential impact that local content
requirements can have on a country’s course of development and questions
whether it may be time to revisit the local content restrictions imposed by
WTO agreements.

A. The AfCFTA in the Context of the WTO Agreements
From its inception, the GATT recognized the contributions that regional
integration, through regional trade agreements, could make to facilitating
293
trade in different regions and the expansion of trade globally. Therefore,
article XXIV of the GATT allows WTO Members to form customs unions
or free-trade areas provided that
the duties and other regulations of commerce maintained in each
[of] the constituent territories and applicable at the formation of
such [a] free-trade area . . . to the trade of [Members] not included
in such area or not parties to such agreement shall not be higher or
more restrictive than the corresponding duties and other regulations
of commerce existing in the same constituent territories prior to the
294
formation of the free-trade area.
The purpose of such free-trade areas should be to facilitate trade
between their members and not raise trade barriers with other WTO

292.
See GATT, supra note 114, art. III; General Agreement on Trade in Services art.
XVII, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183 (1994) [hereinafter GATS]; Agreement on Trade-Related
Investment Measures art. 2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 186 [hereinafter TRIMs Agreement].
293.
See Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade 1994, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/10-24_e.htm
(last visited Nov. 14, 2021).
294.
GATT, supra note 114, art. XXIV(5)(b). With respect to customs unions, the WTO
Members agree that the same language concerning “the general incidence of the duties and
other regulations of commerce applicable before and after the formation of a customs union”
requires an assessment of “weighted tariff rates and customs duties collected.” The duties and
charges to be taken into account should be applied rates of duty, and for incidences where
quantification and aggregation are difficult, “the examination of individual measures,
regulations, products covered and trade flows affected may be required.” WTO, supra note
293.
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295

Members. Under article XXIV, the GATT defines a free-trade area as “a
group of two or more customs territories in which the duties and other
restrictive regulations of commerce . . . are eliminated on substantially all
the trade between the constituent territories in products originating in such
296
territories.” WTO panels and appellate bodies have recognized that WTO
Members have not reached an agreement on the meaning of “substantially
all the trade” but have inferred that although “substantially” does not refer
297
to “all” trade, it means something considerably more than “some.” This
recognition is accompanied by an understanding that article XXIV 8(a)(i) of
the GATT allows for a degree of flexibility with respect to trade
298
liberalization within customs unions and free-trade areas.
The AfCFTA aims to facilitate trade amongst its State Parties, the
majority of which are also Members of the WTO. Through its provisions
and as a result of its constituent negotiations, the AfCFTA requires its State
Parties to liberalize ninety percent of their tariff lines within the first ten or
299
five years for LDCs and non-LDCs, respectively. The AfCFTA further
requires its State Parties to liberalize seven percent of the remaining tariff
lines, designated sensitive products, within thirteen years or ten years for
300
LDCs and non-LDCs, respectively. Therefore, it is evident that the
AfCFTA intends to eliminate duties and other restrictions on substantially
all trade between its State Parties. Furthermore, the AfCFTA’s Protocol on
Trade in Goods provides assurances that the agreement will not create
barriers for trade in goods with other WTO Members through article 5 of
the Protocol, which requires State Parties to apply the principle of National
301
Treatment to imported goods.
Furthermore, the Protocol’s “MostFavoured-Nation” provision does not prevent State Parties from concluding
or maintaining preferential trade arrangements with third parties, provided
that the arrangement does not impede or frustrate the objectives of the
Protocol and that any advantage arising from such a preferential
302
arrangement is extended to other State Parties on a reciprocal basis.
Article V of the GATS also allows for regional agreements in a manner
similar to that of the GATT, provided that they facilitate trade between the
parties to the agreement and do not raise trade barriers for WTO Members
303
who are not parties to the agreement. The GATS requires that regional
295.
296.
297.
Products,
Textile].
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.

GATT supra note 114, art. XXIV(4).
Id. art. XXIV(8)(b).
Appellate Body Report, Turkey—Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing
¶ 48, WTO Doc. WT/DS34/AB/R (adopted Oct. 22, 1999) [hereinafter TurkeyId.
Hartzenberg, supra note 14.
Id.
AfCFTA, supra note 12, art. 5 (Protocol on Trade in Goods).
Id. art. 4 (Protocol on Trade in Goods).
See GATS, supra note 292, art. V(1)(4).
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agreements have substantial sectoral coverage and provide for the absence
or elimination of substantially all existing discriminatory measures and the
304
prohibition of new or more discriminatory measures. In assessing a
regional agreement’s discriminatory measures, consideration is given to the
agreement’s impact on economic integration or trade liberalization among
305
the countries concerned.
The GATS also provides flexibility for
developing countries with respect to its conditions for regional agreements
“in accordance with the level of development of the countries concerned,
306
both overall and in individual sectors and subsectors.” As previously
stated, the AfCFTA aims to liberalize much of the service sectors in key
307
agreed-upon priority sectors. In terms of the requirements for eliminating
discrimination for regional agreements under the GATS, the AfCFTA’s
Protocol on Trade in Services’ “Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment” clause
addresses those issues. It does so by requiring that the “Most-Favoured308
Nation Treatment” is unconditionally extended to State Parties. In terms
of not creating trade barriers with non-State Parties, the Protocol allows for
State Parties to agree to preferential arrangements with non-State Parties in
accordance with article V of the GATS provided that such an arrangement
does not impede or frustrate the objectives of the Protocol and the
preferential arrangement is “extended to all State Parties on a reciprocal and
309
non-discriminatory basis.” In summary, with respect to its regulations on
trade in both goods and services, the AfCFTA strives to facilitate and
liberalize trade, as well as promote economic integration within the region.
It does so without inhibiting trade with non-State Parties, consistent with the
WTO agreements. The WTO agreements allow for the development of
regional trade agreements for specified purposes, but Members still remain
bound to their obligations under the WTO agreements, including the local
310
content restrictions.

304.
Id. art. V(1).
305.
Id. art. V(2).
306.
Id. art. V(3).
307.
See supra p. 2.
308.
AfCFTA, supra note 12, art. 4(1) (Protocol on Trade in Services). Notably, the
AfCFTA applies the “Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment” principle reciprocally with respect to
trade in goods. Id. art. 4(1) (Protocol on Trade in Goods), art. 18.
309.
Id. art. 4(2) (Protocol on Trade in Services).
310.
See, e.g., Turkey-Textile, supra note 297, ¶¶ 57–58 (a WTO Appellate Body held,
with respect to customs unions but concerning language identical to language used to define
regional trade agreements and their purpose under the GATT, that regional agreements could
not require obligations inconsistent with certain provisions under the GATT, unless the party
claiming this defense demonstrates “that the measure at issue is introduced upon the formation
of a customs union that fully meets the requirements of sub-paragraphs 8(a) and 5(a) of
Article XXIV” and “the formation of that customs union would be prevented if it were not
allowed to introduce the measure at issue.”).
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B. Local Content Requirements and the Restrictions
Imposed by WTO Agreements
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
The requirement to treat all trading partners and all those engaged in
trade-related activities similarly resonates in different forms throughout the
provisions of the WTO agreements. Article I of GATT provides for the
requirement of the “Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment,” stating that
with respect to all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of
[a]rticle III, any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted
by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined
for any other country shall be accorded immediately and
unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the
311
territories of all other contracting parties.
Under article II of the GATT, Members are required to provide
Schedules of Concessions, binding commitments that guarantee tariff
concessions to Members, essentially providing a ceiling on customs
312
tariffs. Article II states that each Member “shall accord to the commerce
of the other [Members] treatment no less favourable than that provided for
313
in the appropriate Part of the appropriate Schedule . . .”
Article III(2) of the GATT prohibits the imposition of internal charges
or taxes on imported products in excess of those applied to domestic
314
products. Article III(4), which is more applicable to the discussion of the
local content requirements discussed in this article, requires that the
treatment accorded to national products be afforded to like products of
foreign origin under “all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their
internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or
315
use.” This article is at the root of most cases brought before WTO panels
concerning local content requirements, primarily because of its
316
incorporation into the TRIMS Agreement. It codifies the National
Treatment requirement, the principle that “domestic laws, regulations, and
restrictions affecting the sale and use of products should not afford
317
protection to domestic production.”
WTO panels have held that the National Treatment obligation under
article III(4) of the GATT pertains to “whether a measure modifies the

311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.

GATT, supra note 114, art. I.
See id. art. II.
Id. art. II(1)(a).
Id. art. III(2).
Id. art. III(4).
See infra pp. 101-02, 110-11.
Cimino et al., supra note 162, at 4.
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conditions of competition in the relevant market to the detriment of
318
imported products” such that “the term ‘treatment no less favourable’ in
article III:4 requires effective equality of opportunities for imported
319
products to compete with like domestic products.’” In India – Certain
Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules (India-Solar Cells),
the WTO panel found that neither a threshold degree of detrimental impact
nor a continued market dominance and the provision of other competitive or
market opportunities could preclude a finding of less favorable treatment
320
under article III(4) of the GATT. Therefore, requiring the use of local
inputs as part of a local content requirement could be found to modify the
conditions of competition to the detriment of imported inputs and constitute
a violation of the National Treatment obligation.
National Treatment under the GATT does not apply if the requirement
being challenged relates to a government’s procurement of products for
governmental purposes, as article III(8)(a) of the GATT excludes such
321
government procurements from the National Treatment obligation.
Exceptions to the exclusion of government procurements exist for countries
322
that are signatories to the WTO’s plurilateral Government Procurement
323
Agreement (“GPA”). The GPA “establishes rules requiring that open, fair
and transparent conditions of competition be ensured in government
procurement,” to the extent of the commitments provided in the Schedules
324
of parties to the agreement. However, no African countries are signatories
to the agreement and only two African countries serve as observers to the
325
agreement.
Through article III(5), the GATT also prohibits regulations that require
the “mixture, processing or use of [domestic] products in specified amounts
318.
Panel Report, India–Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules,
¶ 7.92, WTO Doc. WT/DS456/R (adopted Oct. 14, 2016) [hereinafter India-Solar Cells]
(citing Appellate Body Report, Korea–Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and
Frozen Beef, ¶ 137, WTO Doc. WT/DS161/AB/R (adopted Jan. 10, 2001)).
319.
Id. (citing Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Prohibiting
the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, ¶ 5.101, WTO Doc. WT/DS400/AB/R
(adopted June 18, 2014)).
320.
India–Solar Cells, supra note 318, ¶ 7.97.
321.
GATT, supra note 114, art. III(8)(a). In order to be exempted under article
III(8)(a), the foreign product being discriminated against must be a competing alternative to
the product purchased by way of the government procurement and cannot be purchased for the
purpose of commercial resale or with the purpose of using the product in the production of
goods for commercial sale. Id.
322.
A plurilateral agreement, in the context of the WTO, is an agreement to which not
all WTO Members are party. Agreement on Government Procurement, WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gp_gpa_e.htm (last visited Dec. 5, 2021).
323.
Id.
324.
Id.
325.
Agreement on Government Procurement: Parties, Observers and Accessions,
WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/memobs_e.htm (last visited Dec. 5,
2021)
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or proportions” in the production of another product. Thereby, restricting
the use of regulations that require that local inputs must be used to produce
326
final products.

2. General Agreement on Trade in Services
The GATS extends the principle of the “Most-Favoured-Nation
327
Treatment” to trade in services. It extends the principle of National
Treatment to sectors that Members include in their Schedules of Specific
328
Commitments. The GATS also provides an exclusion for government
procurements under article XIII with respect to National Treatment, the
329
Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment, and market access restrictions. A key
characteristic of the GATS is its restrictions on the imposition of
330
requirements that limit market access in trade in services.
These
restrictions include requirements limiting the number of natural persons that
331
a service supplier may employ. It also restricts requirements that impose
332
limitations on the number of service suppliers, the number of service
333
334
operations, the quantity of service output, the specific types of legal
335
entities through which a foreign service supplier may supply a service,
336
and limits on foreign capital participation. The agreement further clarifies
that treatment should be considered to be less favorable if “it modifies the
conditions of competition in favour of services or service suppliers of [a]
Member compared to like services or service suppliers of any other
337
Member.” The GATS’ restrictions essentially prevent governments from
imposing local content requirements, with respect to service industries, on
foreign investors seeking to gain market access, thereby preventing
“governments from using various supportive measures to increase the
competitiveness of domestic service firms and their ability to integrate and
338
upgrade in domestic and global value chains.”
However, the GATS restrictions only apply to those service sectors that
339
a country chooses to include in its Schedule of Specific Commitments.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.

GATT, supra note 114, art. III(5).
GATS, supra note 292, art. II(1).
Id. art. XVII.
Id. art. XIII.
See id. art. XVI.
Id. art. XVI(2)(d).
Id. art. XVI(2)(a).
Id. art. XVI(2)(c).
Id.
Id. art. XVI(2)(e).
Id. art. XVI(2)(f).
Id. art. XVII(3).
JOHNSON, supra note 236, at 17.
See GATS, supra note 292, art. XX.
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Members may modify their Schedules after three years have elapsed from
340
the date on which the commitment entered into force. With respect to the
sectors in which such commitments are undertaken, each Schedule may
341
provide specifications which set the parameters of the commitments.
These specifications include: “(a) terms, limitations and conditions on
market access; (b) conditions and qualifications on [N]ational [T]reatment;
(c) undertakings relating to additional commitments; (d) where
appropriate[,] the time-frame for implementation of such commitments; and
342
(e) the date of entry into force of such commitments.”
These
specifications limit the extent to which the market access commitments
apply and, in turn, the extent to which the market access restrictions apply.
Overall, countries retain the ability to impose local content requirements
that contravene the market access and National Treatment rules in service
sectors that they have not specifically included in their Schedule of Specific
343
Commitments.
In terms of the AfCFTA, the Protocol on Trade in Services requires
State Parties to apply the “Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment” principle to
344
other State Parties with respect to measures affecting trade in services. It
also applies restrictions on market access requirements identical to that of
345
the GATS
and requires State Parties to apply “treatment no less
favourable than it accords its own like services and service suppliers,”
346
National Treatment, subject to their Schedule of Specific Commitments.
The Protocol also provides that State Parties may provide specifications and
parameters identical to those identified in the GATS for sectors in which
347
commitments are undertaken. The Schedule of Specific Commitments
allows for flexibility by only applying market access restrictions and the
principle of National Treatment with respect to sectors in which such
348
commitments are undertaken. The Protocol allows State Parties to
implement subsidies pertaining to trade in services that are in line with their

340.
See GATS, supra note 292, art. XXI(1)(a). The AfCFTA also provides for
procedures to modify Schedules of Specific Commitments three years after their entry into
force. AfCFTA, supra note 12, art. 23(1) (Protocol on Trade in Services).
341.
See GATS, supra note 292, art. XX.
342.
Id. art. XX(1).
343.
JOHNSON, supra note 236, at 17.
344.
AfCFTA, supra note 12, art. 4(1) (Protocol on Trade in Services).
345.
See id. art. 19 (Protocol on Trade in Services); GATS, supra note 292, art. XVI.
346.
AfCFTA, supra note 12, art. 20 (Protocol on Trade in Services); see also AfCFTA,
supra note 12, art. 21 (Protocol on Trade in Services) (stating that “State Parties may
negotiate commitments with respect to measures affecting trade in services not subject to
scheduling under Articles 19 [(Market Access article)] or 20 [(National Treatment article)].”).
347.
See id. art. 22(2) (Protocol on Trade in Services); see also GATS, supra note 292,
art. XX(1).
348.
See AfCFTA, supra note 12, art. 22 (Protocol on Trade in Services) (discussing the
specifications required for Schedules of Specific Commitments).

Fall 2022]

The African Continental Free Trade Area

103

349

development objectives. Similarly, the GATS recognizes that in certain
circumstances, developing countries may need to provide subsidies to
350
support development programs.

3. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
The ASCM concerns the provision of subsidies and “prohibits the use
of subsidies to confer undue advantages to domestic companies over foreign
351
companies.” Article 1 of the ASCM provides that a subsidy is deemed a
subsidy if “there is a financial contribution by a government or any public
352
body within the territory of a Member,” or “any form of income or price
353
support in the sense of [a]rticle XVI of GATT 1994” that is granted by a
government and confers a benefit to domestic firms that is unavailable to
354
foreign firms. The ASCM explicitly prohibits two types of subsidies:
“subsidies that are contingent on export performance (i.e., export subsidies)
and subsidies that are contingent on the use of domestic goods over imports
(i.e. [local content requirements] and other important substitution
355
subsidies).” Furthermore, article 2 of the ASCM requires that a subsidy,
as prohibited under the ASCM, is “specific to an enterprise or industry or
356
group of enterprises or industries.” Under the ASCM, the provision of
“grants, loans, equity infusions, fiscal incentives, and other measures
provided by [a] government and designed to support [the] development and
357
growth of local industries may be restricted.”
A further requirement, which has in recent times complicated the
application of the ASCM’s restrictions on subsidies, is that article 5 of the
ASCM requires the challenging country to demonstrate evidence of
“adverse effects,” as described in article 5 of the ASCM, placing the burden
358
of proving adverse effects on the challenging party. In essence, “subsidies
breach WTO obligations only when they cause adverse effects to the

349.
See id. art. 17 (Protocol on Trade in Services).
350.
GATS, supra note 292, art. XV.
351.
Nwapi, supra note 158, at 194.
352.
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures art. 1.1(a)(1), Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869
U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter ASCM] (stating circumstances under which a financial contribution
conferred is prohibited under the ASCM).
353.
Id. art. 1.1(a)(2); see also GATT, supra note 114, art. XVI (discussing implications
of government subsidies).
354.
See ASCM, supra note 352, art. 1.1.
355.
Cimino et al., supra note 162, at 5–6; ASCM, supra note 352, art. 3.
356.
ASCM, supra note 352, art. 2.1 (providing principles used to determine whether a
subsidy is specific to an enterprise or industry or group of enterprises).
357.
JOHNSON, supra note 236, at 16.
358.
See ASCM, supra note 352, art. 5 (discussing what constitutes “adverse effects”
under the ASCM).
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359

commerce of another WTO [M]ember,” a threshold, which in practice is
360
rarely met.
Subsidies are tools that can be used to develop local content and local
industries for the purpose of trade and for which some policy space exists
for developing countries. However, developing countries often lack the
financial resources needed to provide substantive subsidies that could
361
significantly impact the growth trajectory of nascent industries. In such
362
instances, “the challenge is not policy space, but financial space.” As
previously stated, the AfCFTA allows for the use of subsidies, with respect
to trade in services, to the extent that they align with a State Party’s
development priorities, perhaps signaling a recognition of the role they can
play in industry development. Subsidies are not part of the local content
tools addressed by this article in the subsequent discussion on the available
policy space for local content requirements in light of the definition of local
363
content used in this article.

4. Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures
The WTO Agreement most at issue when it comes to local content
requirements is the TRIMs Agreement. The TRIMs Agreement has been
interpreted by WTO panels as prohibiting any advantage conditioned on the
use of local content in the form of performance and procurement relating to
364
foreign investment. Article 1 of the TRIMs Agreement provides that the
Agreement “applies to investment measures related to trade in goods
365
only.” Furthermore, article 2 provides that “no Member shall apply any
TRIM [trade-related investment measure] that is inconsistent with the
366
provisions of [a]rticle III or [a]rticle XI of GATT 1994.” Article III of the
GATT, as previously discussed, refers to the National Treatment
367
requirement in conducting trade. Article XI of the GATT refers to the
368
elimination of quantitative restrictions on trade. Article 2(2) of the TRIMs
Agreement states that the annex to the Agreement provides “[a]n illustrative
list of TRIMs that are inconsistent with the obligation of [N]ational

359.
Cimino et al., supra note 162, at 3.
360.
Id.
361.
Ramdoo, supra note 37, at x.
362.
Id.
363.
See supra p. 17.
364.
See, e.g., India-Solar Cells, supra note 318, ¶ 7.73; Panel Report, Indonesia Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry, ¶ 14.91, WTO Doc. WT/DS54R
(adopted July 23, 1998) [hereinafter Indonesia-Autos].
365.
TRIMs Agreement, supra note 292, art. 1.
366.
Id. art. 2.
367.
GATT, supra note 114, art. III.
368.
Id. art. XI.
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369

[T]reatment provided for in paragraph 4 of [a]rticle III of GATT 1994.”
The Illustrative List in the annex states that TRIMs include measures that
are “mandatory or enforceable under domestic law or under administrative
370
rulings, or compliance with which is necessary to obtain an advantage.” In
addition, they are measures which require “the purchase or use by an
enterprise of products of domestic origin or from any domestic source,
whether specified in terms of particular products, in terms of volume or
value of products, or in terms of a proportion of volume or value of its local
371
production.”
TRIMs also include measures that require “that an
enterprise’s purchases or use of imported products be limited to an amount
372
related to the volume or value of local products that it exports.” A WTO
panel held that the exception for government procurements, as provided for
under article III(8)(a) of the GATT, applies to local content requirements
373
prohibited under the TRIMs Agreement’s Illustrative List. Essentially,
certain government procurements aside, the TRIMs Agreement prohibits the
use of local content requirements in the form of preferential treatment and
374
quantitative restrictions in the trade of goods.
The assessment of whether a local content requirement violates article 2
of the TRIMs Agreement consists of a determination of whether the
requirement at issue constitutes an investment measure, whether the
requirement concerns trade-related activities, whether the products to which
differential treatment is applied are “like products,” and whether an
375
advantage is conferred contrary to article III(4) of the GATT. WTO
panels have determined that a measure is an investment measure by
376
assessing whether it has investment features or objectives. In Indonesia–
Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry (Indonesia-Autos), the
panel found that measures seeking to develop local manufacturing were
investment measures and that they need not be explicitly adopted as
377
investment regulations.
In India-Solar Cells, the panel found that
measures looking to promote and develop specific industries constituted
378
investment measures.
Furthermore, in Indonesia-Autos, the panel

369.
TRIMs Agreement, supra note 292, art. 2(2).
370.
Id. Annex § 1.
371.
Id. Annex § 1(a).
372.
Id. Annex § 1(b).
373.
Appellate Body Report, Canada - Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable
Energy Generation Sector, Canada-Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program, ¶¶
5.19–.33, WTO Doc. WT/DS412/AB/R (adopted May 24, 2013).
374.
See TRIMs Agreement, supra note 292, Annex §§ 1-2.
375.
See, e.g., Indonesia-Autos, supra note 364, ¶¶ 14.80–.92.
376.
Id. ¶ 14.80.
377.
Id. ¶¶ 14.80–81.
378.
India-Solar Cells, supra note 318, ¶ 7.60 (discussing the finding that “investment
measures” in Indonesia-Autos looking to promote and develop specific industries constituted
investment measures).
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considered local content requirements consistent with the measures
prohibited under the TRIMs Agreement’s annex to be trade-related because
they “always favour the use of domestic products over imported products,
379
and therefore affect trade.” In Brazil–Certain Measures Concerning
Taxation and Charges (Brazil-Taxation), a WTO panel held that article III
of the GATT, which is incorporated into article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement,
is applicable to “pre-market” measures directed at producers, including
380
research and development, and not just final products. Therefore, local
content requirements that affect pre-market activities and production are
prohibited in the same manner as market activities under the TRIMs
Agreement.
In determining what constitutes “like products,” a WTO panel in IndiaSolar Cells reiterated that previous panels have found products to be “like
products” in the context of article III(4) of the GATT (and therefore by
incorporation, under article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement) when the only
381
distinguishing factor is origin. At the crux of the panels’ decisions when
addressing claims alleging violations of article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement
has been the element that the requirement at issue would need to provide an
advantage and that compliance with the requirement is necessary to obtain
382
the advantage. Panels have also held that, not only requirements to which
an enterprise is legally bound, but also requirements that an entity
voluntarily accepts to obtain an advantage from a government, fall under
383
article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement.
Although the GATT principles are woven throughout the AfCFTA’s
Protocol on Trade in Goods, it stops short of the TRIMs Agreement by
384
applying only to trade in goods and not applying to trade-related
investment measures—the key characteristic that brings local content
385
requirements under the regulation of the TRIMs Agreement. Thus, the
Protocol does not impose restrictions on the use of local content
requirements. The Protocol requires State Parties to accord the “MostFavoured-Nation Treatment” to other State Parties in accordance with
article 18 of the AfCFTA, which requires such treatment to be provided on a

379.
Id. ¶ 7.63 (quoting Indonesia-Autos, supra note 364, ¶ 14.82).
380.
Panel Report, Brazil – Certain Measures Concerning Taxation and Charges, ¶
7.70, WTO Doc. WT/DS472/R (adopted Jan. 11, 2019) [hereinafter Brazil-Taxation].
381.
India-Solar Cells, supra note 318, ¶¶ 7.83–.84.
382.
Indonesia-Autos, supra note 364, ¶¶ 14.8–.92; see also India-Solar Cells, supra
note 318, ¶¶ 7.72–.73.
383.
See, e.g., Indonesia-Autos, supra note 364, n.685; see also Brazil-Taxation, supra
note 380, ¶7.65 (stating that government actions that “merely create [] incentives or
disincentives for otherwise voluntary action by private persons” are encompassed under laws,
regulations, or requirements in the context of the GATT, arts. III(2), III(4).); India-Solar Cells,
supra note 318, ¶ 7.87.
384.
AfCFTA, supra note 12, art. 3(1) (Protocol on Trade in Goods).
385.
See supra pp. 101–102.
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386

reciprocal basis with respect to trade in goods. The reciprocal basis on
which such treatment is provided, as previously stated, preserves the acquis
387
of RECs. With respect to tariff barriers, like the GATT, the Protocol
requires State Parties to provide and apply a Schedule of Tariff Concessions
388
in accordance with the adopted tariff modalities. Furthermore, it requires
State Parties to apply National Treatment to products imported from other
State Parties, a “treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like
domestic products of national origin, after the imported products have been
389
cleared by customs.” The Protocol also prohibits State Parties from
imposing quantitative restrictions on imports from or exports to other State
Parties, unless provided for in the Protocol’s annexes and article XI of the
390
GATT. However, the Protocol allows for flexibility for State Parties at
“different levels of economic development or that have individual
391
specificities as recognised by other State Parties.”
The AfCFTA’s
Protocol on Trade in Good’s exclusion of WTO language that restricts local
content requirements which require the use or purchase of local products,
whilst incorporating other WTO clauses concerning trade in goods, signals a
recognition by State Parties of the importance of local content requirements
392
in developing local industries. This is consistent with the proposals made
393
by many African Members of the WTO before the Organization.
However, as WTO Members, many AfCFTA State Parties will still remain
restricted from imposing local content requirements as signatories to the
TRIMs Agreement.

5. Special Considerations for Developing and
Least Developed Countries
It is important to note that the WTO agreements create exceptions for
developing countries and LDCs, many of which are AfCFTA State Parties.
For example, GATT provides a few exceptions. Through the “Decision on
394
Waiver” adopted by the WTO on June 15, 1999, the WTO waived the
provision of the GATT’s “Most-Favoured Nation Treatment” clause for
395
developing countries until June 30, 2009. The waiver was granted “to the

386.
AfCFTA, supra note 12, art. 4(1), (Protocol on Trade in Goods).
387.
See supra p. 12.
388.
See AfCFTA, supra note 12, art. 8(1), (Protocol on Trade in Goods).
389.
Id. art. 5, (Protocol on Trade in Goods).
390.
Id. art. 9 (Protocol on Trade in Goods); see also GATT, supra note 114, art. XI
(requiring the elimination of quantitative restrictions and providing exceptions thereto).
391.
AfCFTA, supra note 12, art. 6 (Protocol on Trade in Goods).
392.
This conclusion is based on the author’s analysis and professional experience.
393.
See discussion infra p.46-47.
394.
World Trade Org., Preferential Tariff Treatment for Least Developed Countries,
Decision on Waiver, WTO Doc. WT/L/204 (adopted on June 15, 1999).
395.
Id. at 1–2.
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extent necessary to allow developing country Members to provide
preferential tariff treatment to products of least developed countries,
designated as such by the United Nations, without being required to extend
396
the same tariff rates to like products of any other Member.” The waiver
397
was extended on May 27, 2009 until June 30, 2019, and subsequently on
398
October 16, 2019 until June 30, 2029.
399
As a result of the “Decision of 28 November 1979,” WTO Members
“may accord differential and more favorable treatment to developing
countries,” without according such treatment to other Members, with
400
respect to the GATT’s non-tariff measures, and may provide preferential
treatment to products originating in developing countries in accordance with
401
the Generalized System of Preferences. Such differential treatment is nonreciprocal and is expected “to be designed and, if necessary, modified, to
respond positively to the development, financial and trade needs of
402
developing countries.” The differential treatment shall also be compliant
with the following criteria: it “a) shall be designed to facilitate and promote
the trade of developing countries and not to raise barriers to or create undue
403
difficulties for the trade of any other contracting parties”; and “b) shall not
constitute an impediment to the reduction or elimination of tariffs and other
404
restrictions to trade on a [M]ost-[F]avoured-[N]ation basis.” The Decision
also provides that less developed Members may enter into regional or global
405
arrangements that provide a mutual reduction or elimination of tariffs,
which set the stage for regional agreements such as the AfCFTA.
Additionally, the Decision specified that Members could provide “special
treatment [to] the least[]developed among the developing countries in the

396.
Id.
397.
World Trade Org., Tariff Treatment for Least Developed Countries, Decision on
Extension of Waiver, WTO Doc. WT/L/759 (adopted on May 27, 2009).
398.
World Trade Org., Preferential Tariff Treatment for Least Developed Countries,
Decision of Waiver, WTO Doc. WT/L/93 (adopted Oct. 16, 2019).
399.
World Trade Org., Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and
Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, Decision, WTO Doc. L/4903 (Nov. 28, 1979)
[hereinafter Differential and More Favourable Treatment].
400.
Id. ¶ 1, 2(b).
401.
Id. ¶ 2(a); see Generalized System of Preferences, UNCTAD, https://unctad.org
/topic/trade-agreements/generalized-system-of-preferences (last visited Mar. 12, 2021)
(stating that the Generalized System of Preferences (“GSP”) refers to a system of
nonreciprocal preferences instituted in 1971 by UNCTAD, through which countries agree to
provide GSP preferences, duty-free and quota-free access, to exports from least developed
countries).
402.
Differential and More Favourable Treatment, supra note 399, ¶ 3(c).
403.
Id. ¶ 3(a).
404.
Id. ¶ 3(b).
405.
Id. ¶ 2(c).
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context of any general or specific measures in favour of developing
406
countries.”
The WTO’s Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration of 2005 (the “Hong
Kong Declaration”) stipulated that developed and developing countries
would provide duty-free and quota-free market access under the GATT on a
lasting basis for products originating from LDCs, and that they were to do
so by 2008 “or no later than the start of the implementation period in a
407
manner that ensures stability, security, and predictability.” It further
provided that Members that faced difficulties in providing such concessions
would have to provide them to at least ninety-seven percent of products
originating from LDCs by the above-referenced deadline, and that they
would have to take steps to achieve compliance with the obligations “taking
into account the impact on other developing countries at similar levels of
408
development.” Under the Hong Kong Declaration, developing country
Members were permitted to “phase in their commitments and [were to]
409
enjoy appropriate flexibility in coverage.”
Under articles XVIII and XII of the GATT, Members may control
imports by “restricting the quantity or value of merchandise permitted to be
410
imported” to “safeguard [their] external financial position and to ensure a
level of reserves adequate for the implementation of [their] program[] of
411
economic development . . .” However, the restrictions instituted “shall not
exceed those necessary: (a) to forestall the threat of, or to stop, a serious
decline in [a Member’s] monetary reserves, or (b) in the case of a
contracting party with inadequate monetary reserves, to achieve a
412
reasonable rate of increase in its reserves.” Both articles require Members
“to progressively relax the restrictions as conditions improve and eliminate
413
them when conditions no longer justify their maintenance.” The 1979

406.
Id. ¶ 2(d). The clause emanating from the Decision is also referred to as the
“Enabling Clause.” Trade and Dev. Comm., Special and Differential Treatment Provisions,
WTO.
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/dev_special_differential_provisions
_e.htm (last visited March 9, 2021).
407.
World Trade Org., Ministerial Declaration of 18 December 2005, WT/MIN(05)
/DEC, Annex F, ¶ 36(a)(i) (Dec. 18, 2005) [hereinafter Hong Kong Declaration].
408.
Id. ¶ 36(a)(ii).
409.
Id. ¶ 36(a)(iii).
410.
GATT, supra note 114, arts. XVIII(B)(9), XII(1).
411.
GATT, supra note 114, art. XVIII(B)(9); see also id. art. XII(1).
412.
GATT, supra note 114, art. XVIII(B)(9); see also id. art. XII(2).
413.
Technical Information on Balance of Payments, WTO., https://www.wto.org
/english/tratop_e/bop_e/bop_info_e.htm (last visited March 9, 2021) (stating further that
article XII of the GATT can be invoked by all WTO Members while article XVIII(B) of the
GATT can only be invoked by developing country Members (including LDCs), and that
article XVIII(B) contains less stringent criteria than article XII for applying the balance-ofpayments exception.) For example, art. XII requires that measures undertaken do not exceed
those necessary “to forestall the imminent threat of, or to stop a serious decline” in monetary
reserves or that measures undertaken should not exceed those necessary for a Member “with

110

Michigan Journal of International Law

[Vol. 43:61

Declaration on Trade Measures Taken for Balance-of-Payments Purposes
(the “1979 Declaration”) added three more conditions for the application of
the balance-of-payments measures,
(i) that preference shall be given to the measure which has “the
least disruptive effect on trade” while abiding by disciplines
provided for in the GATT; (ii) that the simultaneous application of
more than one trade measure for balance-of-payments purposes
shall be avoided; and (iii) that “whenever practicable, contracting
parties shall publicly announce a time schedule for the removal of
414
the measures.”
Furthermore, the 1979 Declaration explicitly provided that measures taken
to correct the balance-of-payments shall not be taken “for the purpose of
415
protecting a particular industry or sector.”
Article XVIII of the GATT provides for adjustments to tariff schedules
to promote the establishment of a particular industry for development
416
purposes. However, article XVIII also requires that in order for these
deviations to be permitted, the requesting Member must consult, and in
most instances, must negotiate the adjustments requested with affected
417
Members.
If agreed upon, the affected Members may require
418
compensation to the extent that they are affected by the tariff adjustment.
The arduous process of requiring developing countries or LDCs to conduct
consultations or negotiations with affected Members in order for them to
agree to the requested tariff adjustments, and then the possibility of having
to make compensatory payments, could deter a developing country Member
or LDC Member from seeking such tariff adjustments, even if for
development purposes.
With respect to the GATS, a similar deviation to correct balance-ofpayments as permitted under the GATT is permitted under article XII of the
419
GATS. The GATS allows for the imposition of restrictions in the event of
“serious balance-of-payments and external financial difficulties or threat

very low monetary reserves, to achieve a reasonable rate of increase in its reserves.” GATT,
supra note 114, art. XII(2). In contrast, article XVIII(B)(9) does not require the same
imminent nature for the threat of a serious decline in monetary reserves. See GATT, supra
note 114, art. XVIII(B)(9)(a). Article XVIII(B)(9) also requires a showing of “inadequate”
monetary reserves as opposed to “very low monetary reserves” with respect to a Member
seeking to achieve a reasonable rate of increase in its reserves. Id. art. XVIII(B)(9)(b); cf.
GATT, supra note 114, art. XII(2)
414.
Id. (discussing the elements of the 1979 Declaration on Trade Measures Taken for
Balance-of-Payments Purposes).
415.
Id.
416.
GATT, supra note 114, art. XVIII(A)(C).
417.
Id.
418.
Id.
419.
See GATS, supra note 292, art. XII.
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420

thereof.” It is important to note that the GATS includes that the balanceof-payments must be serious, an additional requirement that is not present
421
under the GATT balance-of-payments exception. It further provides that
422
the restrictions should not “discriminate among Members”; shall “be
consistent with the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary
423
Fund”; shall “avoid unnecessary damage to the commercial, economic
424
and financial interests of any other Member”; “shall not exceed those
425
necessary to deal with the circumstances described in paragraph 1”; and
“shall be temporary and [] phased out progressively as the situation []
426
improves.”
Article XII further provides that “[i]n determining the
incidence of such restrictions, Members may give priority to the supply of
services which are more essential to their economic or development
[programs]. However, such restrictions shall not be adopted or maintained
427
for the purpose of protecting a particular service sector.”
Article IV of the GATS also provides for the increasing level of
participation of developing countries through negotiated specific
commitments which shall consider
(a) the strengthening of their domestic services capacity and its
efficiency and competitiveness, inter alia through access to
technology on a commercial basis; (b) the improvement of their
access to distribution channels and information networks; and (c)
the liberalization of market access in sectors and modes of supply
428
of export interest to them.
The ASCM also provides for some degree of special and differential
429
treatment for developing country and LDC Members. Under article 27 of
the ASCM, export subsidies do not apply to developing country Members
referred to in annex VII of the ASCM, which include LDCs and countries
430
with a Gross National Product per capita of less than $1000 per annum.
Other developing country Members had a period of eight years from the
date of the entry into force of the WTO Agreement in January 1995 to phase
out their export subsidies, subject to limited extensions following

420.
Id. ¶ 1.
421.
Compare GATS, supra note 292, art. XII(1), with GATT, supra note 114, arts.
XVIII (B)(9), XII(1).
422.
GATS, supra note 292, art. XII(2)(a).
423.
Id. ¶ 2(b).
424.
Id. ¶ 2(c).
425.
Id. ¶ 2(d) (referring to GATS art. XII(1), the balance of payments exception).
426.
Id. ¶ 2(e).
427.
Id. ¶ 3.
428.
GATS, supra note 292, art. IV(1).
429.
See ASCM, supra note 352, art. 27.
430.
Id., art. 27, Annex VII.
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consultations. This transition period expired on January 1, 2003. With
respect to the local content subsidies, article 27 of the ASCM provides that
the prohibition of their use “shall not apply to developing country Members
for a period of five years” and a period of eight years for LDCs, “from the
433
date of [the] entry into force of the WTO Agreement.” The transition
period expired on January 1, 2000 for developing country Members and on
434
January 1, 2003 for LDCs. The transition arrangements for eliminating
local content subsidies were notably more restrictive when compared to the
transition arrangements for export subsidies.
With respect to the TRIMs Agreement, a deviation to correct balanceof-payments is afforded to developing country Members (including
435
LDCs). Article 4 of the TRIMs Agreement allows developing country
Members to temporarily deviate from the provision of article 2, the
obligation of National Treatment with respect to trade-related investment
measures, including with respect to local content as per the annex to the
436
TRIMs Agreement. It permits this deviation to the extent to which the
GATT’s balance-of-payment provision permits Members to deviate from
437
article III and article XI of the GATT. Article III and article XI of the
GATT concern National Treatment on internal taxation and regulation and
the general elimination of quantitative restrictions on imports,
438
respectively.
The TRIMs Agreement also previously applied exceptions which
impacted the use of local content requirements by developing and least
developed countries, including many AfCFTA State Parties. At its
inception, the TRIMs Agreement applied transitional arrangements for
439
Members. The arrangements allowed Members to maintain TRIMs in
place prior to the WTO’s entry into force, for which notice was provided
“within 90 days of the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement” to
the Council for Trade in Goods, for all TRIMs not in conformity with the
440
Agreement. The arrangements provided were for a specified limited time
441
following the entry into force of the WTO in January 1995. The specified
limited time was two years for developed country Members, five years for

431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.
441.

Id., art. 27(3)(4).
Ramdoo, supra note 37, at 36.
ASCM, supra note 352, art. 27(3).
Ramdoo, supra note 37, at 36.
TRIMs Agreement, supra note 292, art. 4.
Id.
Id.
GATT, supra note 114, arts. III, XI.
See TRIMs Agreement, supra note 292, art. 5.
Id. ¶ 1.
Id. ¶ 2.
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442

developing country Members, and seven years for LDC Members. The
Council for Trade in Goods could grant an extension of the transition
periods for developing and least developed Members following a showing
of particular difficulties in implementing the provisions of the TRIMs
443
Agreement. In considering requests for extensions, the Council was to
take into account “the individual development, financial and trade needs of
444
the Member in question.”
Subsequently, the Hong Kong Declaration provided LDCs with an
additional transitional period of seven years for existing TRIMs, provided
that the Members notified the Council for Trade in Goods of the measures
within two years of the Hong Kong Declaration, starting from thirty days
445
after the date of the Declaration. The additional transitional period could
be extended by the Council for Trade in Goods, taking into account the
446
Member in question’s “financial, trade, and development needs.” The
Hong Kong Declaration also allowed Members to introduce new measures
that deviated from obligations arising from the TRIMs Agreement for a
447
period of five years. Any measures adopted under the Hong Kong
Declaration and incompatible with the TRIMs Agreement would need to be
448
phased out by 2020. No notifications of extensions or measures were
449
received since the adoption of the Hong Kong Declaration.
The
availability of these transitional arrangements has now expired.
The transitional arrangements did not provide developing countries with
much more of a transition period than they provided developed countries,
450
nor did they do so for LDCs—many of which are AfCFTA countries. This
was the case despite the developed countries already having highly
developed industries—the growth of some of which benefited from local
content requirements prior to the establishment of the WTO, measures
currently prohibited by the TRIMs Agreement. This meant that AfCFTA
countries, unlike many developed countries, did not have a significant
period of time to apply local content requirements as part of their industrial

442.
Id.
443.
Id. ¶ 3.
444.
Id.
445.
Hong Kong Declaration, supra note 407, Annex F, ¶84.
446.
Id.
447.
Id.
448.
Id.
449.
LDCs in the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) and
Related Decisions, U.N. LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES PORTAL, https://www.un.org
/ldcportal/ldcs-in-the-agreement-on-trade-related-investment-measures-trims-and-relateddecisions/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2021).
450.
The Council for Trade in Goods issued extensions of the transition arrangements
for eight Members pursuant to article 5.3 of the TRIMS Agreement. Trade and Investment:
Technical Information, Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures, WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/invest_e/invest_info_e.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2021).

114

Michigan Journal of International Law

[Vol. 43:61

development policies. Even with the additional transition period provided to
LDCs by the Hong Kong Declaration, the time period afforded to them, and
to developing countries, to continue to employ TRIMs did not amount to a
period sufficient enough to develop sustainable sectors and industries that
451
would be able to compete and take part in global trade.
The disparate impact of restrictions on local content requirements and
the different perspectives concerning the relevance of local content
requirements between developed and developing countries (including
LDCs) is evidenced by the issues raised in the dispute settlement
proceedings brought before the WTO. By 2015, forty-one dispute settlement
proceedings, which included a claim under the TRIMs Agreement, had been
brought before the WTO, twenty-seven of which were brought against
452
developing countries. Out of these twenty-seven proceedings, twenty-five
(ninety-three percent) concerned allegations of local content violations on
453
the part of developing countries. These proceedings show that several
developing countries, many of which include AfCFTA countries, still
require the flexibility to use local content requirements prohibited under the
TRIMs Agreement “to promote upstream and downstream linkages with the
local economy and achieve industrialization and economic
454
transformation.” As a result, the G90—comprised of African, Caribbean,
455
Pacific, and least developed Members —have submitted proposals which
include exempting LDCs from the TRIMs Agreement until they graduate to
456
developing status and cease to be LDCs. It is also worth considering
allowing LDCs and developing countries to preserve or introduce new
TRIMs aligned with a specified policy objective, tied to their development
457
and industrial policy objectives and priorities for a specified period. These
TRIMs would allow for nascent industries and linkages to develop.

451.
This conclusion is based on the author’s analysis and professional experience.
452.
World Trade Organization, Ministerial Conference of 10-13 December 2017,
WTO Doc. WT/MIN(17)/60 4 (Dec. 10–13, 2017) [hereinafter Ministerial Conference 2017].
453.
Id.
454.
Id.
.
455
The G90 is comprised of the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific
States, the African Group and the WTO’s group of least developed countries. See WTO
Members to Discuss Proposals to Enhance Special Treatment for Developing Countries,
WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/devel_21sep20_e.htm (last visited Mar.
19, 2021).
456.
Ministerial Conference 2017, supra note 452, at 2–3.
457.
For example, with respect to trade in goods, the AfCFTA allows State Parties to
impose measures to protect infant industries having national strategic importance for a
specified period of time, provided that the measures are applied in a non-discriminatory
manner and the State Party applying them has “taken reasonable steps to overcome the
difficulties related to such infant industry.” AfCFTA, supra note 12, art. 24 (Protocol on
Trade in Goods).
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6. Bilateral Investment Treaties
Countries seeking to impose local content requirements are further
limited by restrictions imposed by BITs. Currently, there are 2,258 BITs in
458
force globally. According to an UNCTAD report, “as of [the] end [of]
2013, 793 BITs had been concluded by African countries, representing 27
459
[percent] of the total number of BITs worldwide at the time, with more
460
negotiated since and currently under negotiation. Although not a focus of
this article, due to the country variations, this section will provide an
overview of some of the clauses found in BITs that have an impact on the
use of local content requirements, with a focus on BITs to which
461
Mozambique, Kenya, and Rwanda are signatories. BITs often include
restrictions on local content requirements through non-discrimination
provisions, such as National Treatment and “Most-Favoured-Nation
Treatment” clauses, and provisions which require “fair and equitable
462
treatment” and provide absolute standards of protection. BITs require that
neither contracting party shall subject investments from the other
contracting party to treatment less favorable than it accords to investments
from its own nationals or companies, requiring contracting parties to apply
463
the National Treatment principle. The BIT between Kenya and Japan
provides a unique exception to the National Treatment requirement. It
stipulates that National Treatment shall not apply to measures adopted or
maintained “with respect to incentives only for the purpose of promoting
464
small and medium[-]sized enterprises in its [a]rea, to the extent that such
measures do not materially affect the investments or investment activities of
465
[] investors [from] the other [c]ontracting [p]arty.” This unique exception

458.
International Investment Agreements Navigator Investment Policy Hub,
UNCTAD, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements (last
visited Dec. 4, 2021).
459.
Ramdoo, supra note 37, at 26.
460.
See UNCTAD, supra note 58.
461.
Kenya and Rwanda have ratified the AfCFTA, and Mozambique’s ratification of
the AfCFTA is pending. TRALAC, supra note 13.
462.
JOHNSON, supra note 236, at 19; see infra p. 48.
463.
See, e.g., Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, U.K.Kenya, art. 3, Sept. 13, 1999, GR. BRIT. TS NO. 8 (2000) (Cd. 4597); see, e.g., Agreement for
the Promotion and Protection of Investments, U.K.-Mozam., art. 3, Feb. 27, 2007, GR. BRIT.
TS NO. 15 (2007) (Cd. 7150); see, e.g., Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of
Investments, U.K.-Uganda, art. 3, Apr. 24, 1998, GR. BRIT. TS NO. 33 (1998) (Cd. 4037); see,
e.g., Investment Treaty with Mozambique, U.S.-Mozam., art. II(1), Dec. 1, 1998, S. TREATY
DOC. NO. 106-31 (1998) [hereinafter U.S.-Mozam. BIT]; see, e.g., Treaty Concerning the
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-Rwanda, art. 3, Feb. 19, 2008,
S. EXEC. REP. NO. 111-8 (2010) [hereinafter U.S.-Rwanda BIT]; see, e.g., Agreement for the
Promotion of Protection of Investment, Kenya-Japan, art. 3, Aug. 28, 2016 [hereinafter
Kenya-Japan BIT].
464.
Kenya-Japan BIT, supra note 463, art. 3(3).
465.
Id.
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to the National Treatment requirement demonstrates a recognition for the
need to provide preferences to nascent industries to allow them to develop,
including through local content measures.
BITs also require that both contracting parties apply the “MostFavoured-Nation Treatment” to investments from the other contracting
466
party. The BIT between the United States and Mozambique further
requires that either contracting party applies the most favorable of the two
treatments between the National Treatment or the “Most-Favoured-Nation
467
Treatment.” Some BITs specify that preferences obtained as a result of
regional agreements will not extend to investments from either contracting
468
party as a result of a “Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment” clause. BITs
also require that a minimum standard of “fair and equitable treatment and
full protection and security in accordance with customary international law”
469
applies to investments from either contracting party.
BITs may also explicitly prohibit the use of local content requirements.
For example, the BIT between the United States and Mozambique and the
BIT between the United States and Rwanda explicitly prohibit requirements
470
for specific levels or percentages of local content. These BITs also bar
471
quantitative restrictions on imports and exports of goods. Furthermore,
these BITs explicitly prohibit either party from requiring the use of or
472
giving preference to local products or services, thereby prohibiting local
content requirements concerning the procurement of local goods and
services. BITs can also restrict the use of local content requirements
473
“through express restrictions on ‘performance requirements.’” These
performance requirements may also impose restrictions on technology
474
transfer.
For example, the BIT between the United States and
Mozambique and the BIT between the United States and Rwanda explicitly

466.
See, e.g., id. at art. 4; U.S.-Rwanda BIT, supra note 463, art. 4. The United States
allows for exceptions by either party to the application of the “Most-Favoured-Nation
Treatment” and National Treatment principles. US-Mozam. BIT, supra note 463, art. II(2)(a).
467.
US-Mozam. BIT, supra note 463, art. II(1). Note that the 2012 Model U.S. BIT
just requires the application of both the “National Treatment” and “Most-Favoured-Nation
Treatment” principles without the additional requirement of applying the most favorable of
the two. See U.S. MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY arts. 3, 4, (U.S. TRADE. REP.
2012) [hereinafter U.S. Model BIT].
468.
See, e.g., Kenya-Japan BIT, supra note 463, art. 4(5)(a).
469.
See, e.g., id. art. 5(1); see also US-Mozam. BIT, supra note 463, art. II(3)(a); see
also US-Rwanda BIT, supra note 465, art. 5; see also U.S. Model BIT, supra note 467, art. 5.
470.
U.S.-Mozam. BIT, supra note 463, art. VI(a); U.S.-Rwanda BIT, supra note 463,
arts. 8(1)(b), 8(2)(a)(b); see also U.S. Model BIT, supra note 467, art. 8(1)(b)(c).
471.
U.S.-Mozam. BIT, supra note 463, art. VI(b)(c); U.S.-Rwanda BIT, supra note
463, art. 8(1)(a)(d).).
472.
US-Mozam. BIT, supra note 463, art. VI(a); US-Rwanda BIT, supra note 463,
arts. 8(1)(c), 8(2)(b).
473.
JOHNSON, supra note 236, at 19.
474.
IGF, supra note 85, at 84; see, e.g., U.S. Model BIT, supra note 46, art. 8(1)(f).
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state that neither party can mandate or enforce, as a condition to an
investment, a requirement to “transfer a particular technology, a production
475
process or other proprietary knowledge.” Interestingly, the BIT between
the United States and Rwanda provides a caveat clarifying that this
requirement should not be construed to prevent any party from enforcing a
requirement to employ or train workers in its territory, provided that such
employment or training does not result in the “transfer of a particular
technology, a production process, or other proprietary knowledge to a
476
person in its territory.”
This clarification allows for the use of
employment, as well as skills and capacity building as local content tools.
BITs can also further restrict market access requirements concerning the
formation of entities by restricting requirements on the nationality of board
477
members and senior management in entities. Notably, the 2012 U.S.
Model BIT allows for a party to require that the majority of the board of
directors of a covered investment “be of a particular nationality, or resident
in the territory of [a] Party [to the agreement], provided that the requirement
does not materially impair the ability of the investor to exercise control over
478
its investment.” This approach could allow for more local representation
in projects. The obligations arising from BITs must be read in concert with
the obligations arising from international trade agreements in framing the
parameters of possible local content requirements.

C. The Available Policy Space for Local Content Requirements
Within the Context of the WTO Agreements
Currently, forty-four of Africa’s fifty-four countries are Members of the
479
480
WTO, of which thirty-four have ratified the AfCFTA, nine have signed
the agreement and have ratification pending, one has parliamentary approval
481
for ratification pending, and the nine African countries currently seeking
482
to accede to the WTO are signatories to the AfCFTA. Essentially, all of
the WTO’s African Members currently are or will be AfCFTA State Parties.
As a result of the WTO agreements, WTO Members and all AfCFTA State
Parties are left with limited options when devising local content
requirements. When considering and developing local content requirements
outside of the realm of providing subsidies, which would be effective in
spurring both productivity and diversification whilst remaining compliant

475.
U.S.-Rwanda BIT, supra note 463, art. 8(1)(f); see U.S.-Mozam. BIT, supra note
463, art. VI(e).
476.
U.S.-Rwanda BIT, supra note 463, art. 8(1)(f) n.13.
477.
See, e.g., id. art. 9(1).
478.
U.S. Model BIT, supra note 467, art. 9(2).
479.
WTO, supra note 289.
480.
TRALAC, supra note 13.
481.
Id.
482.
WTO, supra note 21.
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with the WTO agreements, it is important to focus on whether the
requirements would modify the conditions of competition or provide an
advantage, and whether compliance with the requirement is necessary to
obtain the advantage. Policymakers should consider such factors as they
develop local content policies as WTO panel decisions have already held
that local content measures constitute investment and trade-related measures
even when they are not constructed to affect trade-like activities. The
panels’ decisions hinge on this analysis.
The AfCFTA’s State Parties are left with limited options when devising
local content requirements. The local content tool with the widest
possibilities in the context of international trade agreements is the
requirement of skills training, as it is not restricted by such agreements.
Skills development allows for greater participation in projects and
economies as a whole; it can result in an increased pool of potential local
employees as well as professional progression amongst local employees.
Furthermore, capacity building can “improve the absorptive capacities for
483
(targeted) local content measures,” thereby having a spillover effect that
results in the creation of linkages such as the development of local suppliers
484
as employees develop different trades and production skills. Skills
development can also be achieved by requiring investors to contribute to
government funds focused on training locals in the sectors relevant to the
investor’s and the country’s industrial policy, such as in the case of Ghana’s
485
Local Content Fund and Namibia’s Petrofund. Some countries may also
have domestic economic policies that prevent their government’s
engagement and investment with respect to national resources or strategic
projects that would result in a loss of jobs to locals. Such a policy would be
part of a government’s considerations for engagements in some projects and
would also indirectly have an impact on further developing skills and
capacity by encouraging the incorporation of skills development in projects
that may require government participation.
The impact of skills development can also be achieved and enhanced
through technology transfer requirements (if not prohibited by a BIT) as
locals are exposed to and trained to use new technology. However,
“technology transfer [also] requires adequate absorptive capacity in the host
country, and government support for education and training is fundamental
486
for developing that capacity.”
Notably, requiring local equity
participation, the use of joint-ventures, and certain activities to be conducted
in host countries (if not prohibited by a BIT), to the extent that they concern
487
trade in goods, are also potential tools to develop skills and build capacity.

483.
484.
485.
486.
487.

JOHNSON, supra note 236, at 10.
See id. at 10–11.
See supra pp. 82–83.
JOHNSON, supra note 236, at 11.
Id. at 16.
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Skills development and the transfer of technology are likely to result in an
increase in economic productivity, innovation, and diversification in
production outputs, all of which would result in increased productive
capacity, allowing countries to become integrated into regional and global
value chains, and increase regional trade flows within the AfCFTA.
Such requirements would also help countries make progress in
achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (“SDGs”), especially SDG 8,
which aims to “Promote Sustained, Inclusive and Sustainable Economic
488
Growth, Full and Productive Employment and Decent Work for All.”
More specifically, local content requirements aimed at skills development
and the transfer of technology would help countries achieve SDG 8.2, which
aims to “achieve higher levels of economic productivity through
diversification, technological upgrading and innovation, including through a
489
focus on high-value added and labour[-]intensive sectors.”
Such
requirements would also put countries in a better position to achieve, at least
in part, SDG 8.3, as they strive to “promote development-oriented policies
that support productive activities, decent job creation, entrepreneurship,
creativity and innovation, and encourage the formalization and growth of
micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises, including through access to
490
financial services.” They would also help countries “promote inclusive
and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation” in accordance with
491
SDG 9.
In terms of market entry requirements, in sectors which a country has
included in its Schedule of Commitments under GATS, there is limited
room for countries to employ local content tools. However, countries could
be suggestive rather than prescriptive with their requirements, suggesting
that investors maximize their capacity to employ locals, use local services,
or partner with locals in forming legal entities, to the extent that they meet
requisite standards and requirements, and doing so is economically
492
feasible. Schedules of Commitments, and more significantly, the ability of
countries to make specific commitments in certain sectors and not others,
allows for a more flexible application of local content requirements with
respect to trade in services.

488.
Sustainable Development Goal 8: Promote Sustained, Inclusive and Sustainable
Economic Growth, Full and Productive Employment and Decent Work for All, U.N. DEP’T
ECON. & SOC. AFFS., https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal8 (last visited March 9, 2021).
489.
Id.
490.
Id. This article notes that these forms of local content requirements would not
address the part of Sustainable Development Goal 8.3 that concerns access to financial
services.
491.
Sustainable Development Goal 9: Build Resilient Infrastructure, Promote Inclusive
and Sustainable Industrialization and Foster Innovation, U.N. DEP’T ECON. & SOC. AFFS.,
https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal9 (last visited March 19, 2021).
492.
See supra p. 83–84 (discussing Botswana and Tanzania’s application of suggestive
requirements for local employment in the natural resources sector).
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Even in cases where countries are otherwise restricted, such as by their
Schedule of Commitments, local industries can be supported through
government procurements conducted in accordance with the exceptions for
government procurements under the GATT, the GATS, and the TRIMs
493
Agreement. An example of a government’s policy on procurements
supporting local industries is Australia’s Indigenous Procurement Policy.
Australia introduced this policy in 2015, which mandates preferences and
support for indigenous-owned enterprises for government procurements
with the aim of stimulating indigenous entrepreneurship and economic
494
participation.
In terms of local content requirements targeting procurement activities
involving the private sector, the restrictions under the TRIMS Agreement
495
concern measures that: 1) require firms to use local goods; 2) “impose
496
quantitative restrictions on imports or exports of goods”; and 3) “bar[]
497
firms from exporting unprocessed raw materials.” Therefore, countries
have to look to other local content tools that would increase local
participation in procurements, in terms of the use of local products, and that
would support the development and competitiveness of local goods and
498
local production. Such tools would also contribute to the achievement of
the aforementioned SDGs.
Some countries have required foreign investors to provide some form of
499
an industry participation or local content plan. Plans describe how an
investor intends to incorporate and provide fair opportunities for local
500
participation. Such plans allow companies to describe how they intend to
account for local participation in projects through procurement, as well as
through employment or skills training, thereby addressing two local content
501
objectives. A plan could also include a description of how an investor
intends to support the integration of local industries into the supply chains
502
of the project and into global supply chains generally. The requirement to
provide a plan does not need to be prescriptive in terms of its required

493.
See supra pp. 97–98, 102.
494.
Indigenous Procurement Policy December 2020, NAT’L INDIGENOUS AUSTL.
AGENCY 8, https://www.niaa.gov.au/sites/default/files/publications/ipp-guide.pdf.
495.
TRIMs Agreement, supra note 292, Annex ¶ 1(a); JOHNSON, supra note 236, at 16.
496.
JOHNSON, supra note 236, at 16; TRIMs Agreement, supra note 292, Annex ¶
1(b).
497.
JOHNSON, supra note 236, at 16.
498.
See id. at 16, 18.
499.
See, e.g., Ghana Local Content Regulations, supra note 209, art. 7; see, e.g.,
Australian Jobs Act 2013 (Cth) s 17 (Austl.).
500.
See, e.g., Ghana Local Content Regulations, supra note 209, arts. 9, 4(7); see, e.g.,
Australian Jobs Act, supra note 501, ss 34–35.
501.
See, e.g., Ghana Local Content Regulations, supra note 209, art. 9.
502.
See, e.g., Australian Jobs Act, supra note 499 s 36(1)(f); see also Ghana Local
Content Regulations, supra note 209, art. 9.
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content, such as setting local content targets in the form of mandatory or
numerical targets, and should not be the basis of the selection of an investor.
For example, a requirement could be that a plan be submitted within a
specified number of days before a project’s trigger date followed by its
503
approval by the relevant authorities. Prescriptive terms and selection
criteria could encroach on violations of international trade agreements.
Many countries take the requirement of plans a step further, requiring their
publication and the submission of regular, perhaps annual, reports detailing
504
progress made on the industrial and local content plans. The requirement
of the publication of plans encourages accountability and provides
awareness with respect to available opportunities amongst local participants.
The need to consistently report on progress and the publication of plans may
also put pressure on companies to comply with them, thus incentivizing
companies to use more local goods, services, and employees.
Typically, in large scale projects, in particular those in the extractives
sector, investors are required to provide procurement plans for the duration
of the project, identifying procurements required at each stage of the
505
project. Plans can include information about employment and training
specifications of skills needed and local skills shortages, as well as goods
and services needed and local shortages. Procurement plans allow
governments to foreshadow investment needs at different stages of projects
and therefore invest in advance in the development of skills to produce
specific goods and services, and in the development of relevant sectors
generally, through support initiatives provided to local participants.
Additionally, some countries require investors to ensure the fair
participation of local participants in procurements, thus ensuring that they
are provided the same opportunity as global suppliers to compete on an
506
equal and transparent basis. These countries require that notices of
procurements are made accessible to local suppliers and require investors to
507
ensure that local suppliers are provided a reasonable time to tender.
Investors are expected to ensure that tenders are free from non-market
burdens that might rule out local participants and that they are structured in
508
such a way as to allow participation.
In some jurisdictions, such as in Australia, investors in major projects
(defined as projects with a capital expenditure equal to or greater than $500
509
million Australian dollars) are required to conduct awareness programs

503.
504.
505.
506.
507.
508.
509.

See, e.g., Australian Jobs Act, supra note 499, ss 17, 18.
See, e.g., id. s 25.
See, e.g., Ghana Petroleum Act, supra note 197, § 27.
See, e.g., Australian Jobs Act, supra note 499, s 35.
See, e.g., id.
See, e.g., id.
Id. s. 8(1)(2).
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and publicize opportunities to supply goods and services. Investors are
expected to ensure that local entities are able to compete by publishing
required procurement standards and expectations in relation to the key
511
goods or services required for the project. The Australian Jobs Act also
requires investors to provide feedback to unsuccessful local bidders, which
must include recommendations for relevant training, and “relevant skills
512
capability and capacity development.” Investors could also be required to
form business development task forces, as has been the case in some
513
Australian states. These task forces would serve the purpose of informing
locals of contracting opportunities and consider opportunities more suited
514
for local contracting. They could also develop business support initiatives
515
and incubation services to develop local industries.
The use of
procurement plans and their publication, and requirements ensuring local
businesses are able to compete and are aware of procurement opportunities
along project value chains, as well as requirements that promote skills and
capacity development, present opportunities for local content requirements
to develop the productive capacity needed for State Parties to fully
participate in intraregional trade under the AfCFTA.

D. The Development Impact of Local Content Requirements: Is It Time
to Revisit the WTO Agreements’ Local Content Restrictions?
Although some policy space remains under WTO agreements for
countries to adopt local content requirements, their actions are limited in
terms of what local content tools remain permissible. Despite restrictions,
“[l]ocal content policies have been and continue to be used by countries of
all income levels, in different sectors, and with varying levels of success in
achieving their policy aims of maximizing the benefits that foreign direct
516
investment can, but does not necessarily, bring.” This is in part due to the
enforcement mechanisms of WTO agreements, which are only triggered
when countries bring claims against one another before WTO panels,
517
alleging a violation of an agreement. In addition, the preferred approach
510.
Id. s 36.
511.
Id. ss 35–36.
512.
Id. s 35(g).
513.
See, e.g., Native Title Report 2006: Chapter 5: The Argyle Participation
Agreement, AUSTL. HUM. RTS. COMM’N, https://humanrights.gov.au/our-work/native-titlereport-2006-chapter-5-argyle-participation-agreement#endnote26 (last visited March 8, 2021)
(discussing the terms of the Argyle Diamond Mine Participation Agreement, “a registered
Indigenous Land Use Agreement (ILUA) between Traditional Owners of the East Kimberley
region of Western Australia, the Kimberley Land Council and Argyle Diamond Mine.”).
514.
See, e.g., id.
515.
See, e.g., id.
516.
JOHNSON, supra note 236, at 7.
517.
See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dispute
art. 3(7), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
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under the WTO is for countries concerned to consult and attempt to settle
the disputes amongst themselves before resorting to the Dispute Settlement
Body, which is responsible for ultimately forming panels to resolve
518
disputes. Furthermore, diplomatic, political, and economic interests, as
well as the costs associated with filing claims, often act as a deterrent to
519
bringing forward such claims.
However, in many cases, international agreements remain a deterrent
520
for countries to develop and implement local content requirements. The
limitations imposed on the policy space with respect to the development of
local content requirements, in contrast with the development that the use of
local content can stimulate and the substantial progress it can help countries
make toward achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) raises
questions. Specifically, it “raises questions about whether and to what extent
[these] treaties are consistent with the policies and policy space needed in
521
this new era of sustainable development.” Local content requirements can
help countries develop industries, diversify their economies, develop and
participate in value chains, and in turn spur sustainable development.
According to a United Nations Industrial Development Organization
(“UNIDO”) Report, “Africa’s Manufactured Value Added (MVA)
522
accounted for just 1.6 [percent] of the global total in 2014.” While studies
have shown that “a country’s growth in terms of its participation in [global
value chains] is correlated with higher rates of economic growth in
523
general,” this is especially true where the use of local inputs in exports are
524
concerned. The cases of the Asian success stories and Norway, as

Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401. Note that disputes concerning local content restrictions between
countries and investors arising from BIT provisions are settled in accordance with the dispute
resolution clauses of the BITs, which generally require arbitration proceedings. See, e.g. U.S.
Model BIT, supra note 467, art. 34.
518.
Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes, A Unique Contribution, WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm (last visited March 12,
2021). Consultation and mediation remain an option even when a case has advanced to
different stages. Id.
519.
See generally JOHNSON, supra note 236, at 16 (discussing enforcement under the
TRIMs Agreement).
520.
See supra p. 110–11 (discussing the number of claims brought before the WTO
alleging local content violations on the part of developing countries).
521.
JOHNSON, supra note 236, at 15.
522.
Ministerial Conference 2017, supra note 452, at 2.
523.
JOHNSON, supra note 236, at 14 (citing UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT
2013: GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS: INVESTMENT AND TRADE FOR DEVELOPMENT 151 (2013)
https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/wir2013_en.pdf).
524.
Id. at 14 n.34 (stating that “[o]ne study found that backward participation (that is,
the extent to which domestic firms use foreign inputs in exports) is not correlated with income
level while ‘countries with higher per capita GDP tend to have higher forward participation
ratios’ capturing the extent to which a country’s exports are used as inputs in products
exported by other countries.”).
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525

previously discussed, are striking examples of this. In the extractives
sector, data on spending by the companies British Petroleum and Anglo
American showed that they spent “an estimated 87% and 64%, respectively,
526
of total value created on suppliers in 2014.” In contrast, they spent two
percent and eleven percent, respectively, of total value created on tax and
527
royalty payments.
This data demonstrates the potential value of
developing production linkages and value chains through local content
requirements, and their potential to contribute to sustainable economic
development.
The Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
cites attaining sustainable development as one of its key objectives and
recognizes the
need for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing
countries, and especially the least developed among them, secure a
share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the
528
needs of their economic development.
However, the divergent directions of some international trade
requirements, namely those which concern restrictions on local content
529
requirements which were used by many developed countries prior to the
adoption of WTO agreements, and the policies that are needed to support
development, raise a crucial question: Do “trade and investment treaties
leave [] governments adequate policy space to achieve agreed upon
530
development objectives,” and in many cases, development objectives
agreed upon at the global level? It may be time for international trade
regimes to be revisited to ensure that they support an enabling international
economic environment for sustainable development.
The time-barred waiver of the “Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment”
clause under the GATT, the tariff and quota concessions, the allowances
afforded by the balance-of-payments provisions—which can solely be used
to attain an economic equilibrium and explicitly can’t be tied to sector or
industry development, the non-obligatory nature of the concessions
developed countries can provide developing countries, and the expired
transitional periods for the implementation of the TRIMs Agreement leave
little space for countries to develop policies that are likely to promote
sustainable economic growth. These waivers and concessions are unlikely to
result in the development of local skills, increased local participation, and
enhanced local productive capacity, all of which are necessary requirements

525.
526.
527.
528.
529.
530.

See supra pp. 86–87, 90–91.
JOHNSON, supra note 236, at 9.
Id.
WTO Agreement, supra note 288, pmbl.
JOHNSON, supra note 236, at 9, 15.
Id. at 15.
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for a country to attain long-term sustainable development. These
requirements are also necessary to spur the innovation, industry
development, diversification, value chain creation, and integration that is
needed for many African states with low levels of productivity and nascent
industries to successfully trade under the AfCFTA.

VI. Will the AfCFTA Displace Foreign Partnerships?
At the outset, it may seem as though Africa’s long-standing traditional
trading partners might be displaced by increased intra-African trade, but this
is unlikely, as increased intraregional trade will result in several
developments which would be attractive to foreign investment. For
example, greater productive capacity and larger markets could spur demand
for non-regional goods, services, and product inputs as regional supply
531
chains develop. It is estimated that the increase in the domestic production
of consumer and capital goods in Africa could have significant multiplier
effects on G20 economies, amounting to almost $315 billion USD in value
532
resulting from investment and the consumption of goods. It is also
estimated that this would result in the generation of 7.5 million jobs in G20
533
economies. In addition, reduced production costs across Africa due to
economies of scale, the result of a larger continental market, could be
attractive to foreign investors, especially those interested in shifting toward
the production of industrial and manufactured goods, which would provide
a further boost to intraregional trade.
Such investments could have an even greater impact on development
across African countries if conducted in partnership with local businesses,
contributing to the growth of local capacity and local production. There are
opportunities for joint investment, either through intracontinental private
sector partners or through public-private partnerships, the impact of which
is felt and seen beyond the financial investment. Partnerships could also
result in spillover effects, which “occur when the ownership of investment
projects is shared between domestic and foreign firms, for in such cases[,]
foreign firms are more likely to source their suppliers locally and so would
be more willing to share their technology since this can improve the
performance of their suppliers, whereas wholly owned affiliates would tend
534
to import their inputs.” Such spillover effects would contribute even
further to the growth of local businesses and industries, which could
enhance trade participation under the AfCFTA.
Furthermore, as infrastructure remains a major bottleneck in the
successful implementation of the AfCFTA, foreign investment in this sector

531.
532.
533.
534.

WILLIAMS & COOK, supra note 5, at 2.
AFR. DEV. BANK GRP, AFR. ECON. OUTLOOK 89 (2018).
Id.
Nwapi, supra note 153, at 16–17.
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will be needed and encouraged to address this obstacle. Moreover, the
effective implementation of the AfCFTA could help “reduce[] uncertainty
over trading rules and market access” within and among African countries,
535
thereby improving the African business environment. In doing so, making
the AfCFTA “an essential ingredient to unlocking private sector decisions to
expand existing and start new businesses to take advantage of the
536
agreement.”
Development finance institutions and partner countries could also
provide support in private sector development, for example in developing
and scaling manufacturing. This support would help countries to develop
sectors and industries, diversify their industries and production, and
contribute to regional and global value chains, thereby contributing to the
effectiveness of the AfCFTA. Additionally, by requiring large projects to
use local content, whether through the recruitment of local employees,
training of local employees, or the transfer of technology, development
partners could not only support skills development, but also support private
sector development and the development of tradable goods and services.
Local content requirements, especially as they concern local skills
development through the employment of locals, are unlikely to contravene
with partner countries’ possible policy prohibitions on promoting sectors
that would result in job losses at home.
Both national and multilateral development agencies could also provide
technical assistance and support capacity building with respect to trade
facilitation and other trade-related matters, which would help with the
537
implementation of the AfCFTA. Furthermore, development agencies that
push for reforms intended to produce sustainable economic growth could
also consider advocating for some of the policy reforms necessary to
produce a favorable trading and business environment in the African
countries with which they engage. Such reforms would not only support the
implementation of the AfCFTA but would also support private sector
development and FDI in the region. Overall, showing an interest in and
finding ways to support the AfCFTA could improve relations between
partner countries which would go a long way in promoting FDI and global
SDGs.
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VII. Conclusion
While the implementation of the AfCFTA does not guarantee
intraregional trade, it does provide an incentive for governments to make
trade with State Parties under the Agreement more attractive and
538
accessible. However, there are existing bottlenecks which stand in the
way of the AfCFTA achieving its full potential. One such bottleneck is the
limited availability of tradable goods resulting from limited productive
capacity. Although international trade agreements impose limitations on the
extent of their use, local content requirements present an avenue for sectors
and industries to develop by strengthening productive capacity to produce
more local goods and services for export. As sectors and industries develop,
local content requirements could also contribute to the integration of
African economies into global value chains and, perhaps more importantly,
they could contribute to the development of regional value chains in the
long term, thereby spurring sustainable economic development. The
potential impact of local content requirements on economic development
raises questions as to whether international trade restrictions on their use
should be revisited. Local content requirements are a long-term solution,
and while they are not the only solution, they present a sustainable solution
which must be coupled with complementary and supportive measures. They
present an avenue to capitalize on investments in order to develop additional
and sustainable growth beyond the life of the asset, project, and the
resource. As African governments look to seize the benefits presented by
the AfCFTA for their countries, they should use this opportunity to address
many of the bottlenecks that could impact the overall effectiveness of the
AfCFTA, thereby pushing their countries forward and allowing their
countries to reap the full benefits of their participation in intraregional trade.
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